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 From the recent literature, one observes a growing discontent with neoliberalism 
among scholars of human dignity. New nomenclature such as “the new chronic,” 1 
“wounded attachments,” 2  and “third-order suffering” 3  have become part of the 
conversation in how dignity is defined. Most notably, they identify the human spirit as a 
dimension of political action – such as human rights protection – opening the door for 
fresh discourse on how the human spirit could be protected via law. I explore how the 
law is used to protect the human spirit and how law may adapt to someday explicitly 
protect all souls from the ills of postmodernity. 
 My objective is to build a concrete understanding of how the human spirit 
features in human rights law. How can one fix the problem of neoliberalism’s cultural 
imperialism using a cultural rights approach? I ask: Why not address cultural imperialism 
of non-indigenous souls much like the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) has done for indigenous souls? That is, why not protect 
the whole of humanity with adequate cultural rights to spirit, and how would that look? I 
determine that there are clauses in UNDRIP and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) that would promote such a measure. 
                                                        
1 Eric Cazdyn, The Already Dead: The New Time of Politics, Culture, and Illness (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2012), 2. 
2 See Wendy Brown, “Wounded Attachments,” Political Theory 21.3 (1993): 390-410. 
3 Bruce Rogers-Vaughn, Caring for Souls in a Neoliberal Age (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 
171. 
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“I give culture this meaning: exercise of thought, acquisition of general ideas, habit of 
connecting causes and effects…I believe that it means thinking well, whatever one thinks, 
an therefore acting well, whatever one does.” — Antonio Gramsci 
Introduction 
 In Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison Michel Foucault called the soul 
“the prison of the body.”4 Foucault’s seminal genealogy-imaginary of European prisons 
awoke the 20th century West to its own cruelty to the soul, within the historical narrative 
of Western progress. Still significant, Foucault’s theory of the “‘micro-physics’ of the 
punitive power” continues to challenge Western views of control, security, sex, and 
institutions.5 
 Humans are undoubtedly spiritual creatures that subsequently need to be 
spiritually free to enjoy their full capabilities. Having a spirit, a body and emotions 
together make us uniquely sentient beings – with dignity, freedom and deserving of equal 
humanity. One might distinguish between sites of external dignity and internal dignity. A 
person’s external dignity represents ‘bodily integrity’, whereas internal dignity is his or 
her ‘spiritual integrity’. The language of individual ‘dignity’ is the foundation of 
international human rights law, but how well has individual spiritual dignity been 
safeguarded by international human rights law? A growing body of literature shows that 
modernity – specifically the spread of neoliberalism and its soft power over individuals 
and groups – suffocates peoples’ spiritual dignity now more than ever before. With 
physical slavery made illegal by international law, the forces of postmodernity have 
turned to the spiritual enslavement of citizenry. Discursive effects resonate from such 
spiritual degradation. 
                                                        
4 Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 2012), 30. 
5 Foucault, Discipline & Punish, 29. 
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 This thesis finds that Foucault was correct about the modern soul. I conclude that 
humanity has neglected the soul, in part, because of its embrace of neoliberal policies. 
Foucault had a significant amount to tell us about the rise and inevitable fall of 
neoliberalism. Today, one hears Nobel Laureate in Economic Science Joseph Stiglitz 
emphatically say, “Neoliberalism is dead.”6 After the 2008 economic failure, the rise in: 
Imperial crimes in the form of the USA PATRIOT Act and 
National Defense Authorization Act, which gave the 
president sweeping and arbitrary power that resembles a 
police or neofascist state; and social crimes principally 
manifest in a criminal justice system that is in itself 
criminal (where torturers, wire tappers, and Wall Street 
violators of the law go free yet poor criminals, such as drug 
offenders, go to prison),7 
 
neoliberalism is facing its firmest criticism yet. Stiglitz finds neoliberalism economically 
unsustainable. In the era of Trump, America’s social bankruptcy is for all to bear witness. 
I analyze what neoliberalism has rendered humanity spiritually by viewing spirituality as 
an irreducible component of culture – knowing that together social, economic, and 
cultural rights are closely interrelated and interdependent. 
What is Neoliberalism? 
 Neoliberalism is not just a set of economic policies. Instead, it is a philosophy that 
provides a narrative for individual human life and “progressively occupies economic, 
political, and cultural spaces.”8 Neoliberalism’s proponents praised it for developing a 
more efficient society run by a market that rendered winners and losers. “Unlike liberal 
economies, in which the state and markets occupied separate concerns, neoliberalism 
                                                        
6 Will Martin, “Nobel Prize-winning economist Stiglitz tells us why 'neoliberalism is dead',” Business 
Insider, Aug. 19, 2016. 
7 Christa Buschendorf and Cornel West, Black Prophetic Fire (New York: Beacon Press, 2014), 162-3. 
8 Rogers-Vaughn, Caring for Souls in a Neoliberal Age, 35. 
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envisioned governments taking an active role to guarantee the protection and free 
functioning of markets.”9  Markets would be the engine – and their performance the 
metric – for societal wellbeing. With these put into place, we now live in a “neoliberal 
world.”10 The neoliberal revolution began intellectually in the 1970s and was first applied 
in the 1980s. Even after the crisis of 2008, neoliberalism has remained a “theory of 
everything” for many.11 
 What does neoliberalism leave us with? The answer is: A tremendous income gap 
between the elites and workers on a global scale. It assembles a “global hegemony that 
does not look like a hegemony, one that claims to be a liberator of humankind even as it 
shackles the human soul.”12 Neoliberalism is not just an economic and political project 
but also a cultural project. 
 Friedrich Hayek – a sage and a hero to many neoliberal proponents – understood 
this. In The Road to Serfdom Hayek wrote on society, “This is really the crux of the 
matter. Economic control is not merely control of a sector of human life which can be 
separated from the rest; it is the control of the means for all our ends.”13 William Davies 
observes: “A defining trait of neoliberalism is that it abandons this liberal conceit of 
separate economic, social and political spheres, evaluating all three according to a single 
economic logic.”14 Margaret Thatcher understood the neoliberal theology of the market 
better than any other politician of her time. She said that “Economics are the method; the 
                                                        
9 Ibid., 36-7. 
10 See Manfred B. Steger and Ravi K. Roy, Neoliberalism: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010) 
11 See Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived the Financial 
Meltdown (London: Verso, 2013) 
12 Rogers-Vaughn, Caring for Souls in a Neoliberal Age, 42. 
13 Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents, The Definitive Edition, ed. B. Caldwell 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 126-7. 
14 William Davies, The Limits of Neoliberalism: Authority, Sovereignty and the Logic of Competition 
(London: SAGE Publications, 2014), 20. 
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object is to change the heart and soul.”15 
 Competition and inequality are the overriding principles of neoliberal societies. 
Foucault observed that neoliberalism is a parting from a simple exchange capitalist 
economy of the market that has increased public good in the West for centuries to a 
capitalism of competition. Competition – not exchange – is the new principle and basic 
good. According to Wendy Brown, this means “inequality replaces equality.”16 The tenet 
of self-interest has created a way of looking at and treating people, too. That new human 
is known as homo oeconomicus. This machine-like social Darwinian is encouraged to be 
passionless. A culture of sadism, argues Chris Hedges, consequently dominates America. 
Social Wellbeing under Neoliberalism 
 Competition and inequality are both hallmarks of neoliberalism; they are also 
detrimental to the human spirit. According to Bruce Rogers-Vaughn’s analysis 
“neoliberalism is both a form of hegemonic control that serves the interests of financial 
elites and a form of governance that adapts to local circumstances and shapes individual 
subjects and their personal relationships.”17 Stuart Hall writes succinctly: “neoliberalism 
does constitute a hegemonic project.”18 Milton Friedman famously said in the 1980s that 
the only social responsibility of corporations is to increase shareholder profits. His 
neoliberal ideology glorifies profits for the rich, which never actually trickle down to the 
poor. Only inequality prevails in Friedman’s America. 
 In Caring for Souls in a Neoliberal Age, Rogers-Vaughn presents a scatterplot 
                                                        
15 Ronald Butt, “Mrs. Thatcher: The First Two Years,” The Sunday Times May 3, 1981. 
16 Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (Brooklyn: Zone Books, 2015), 
64. 
17 Rogers-Vaughn, Caring for Souls in a Neoliberal Age, 54-5. 
18 Stuart Hall, “The Neoliberal Revolution: Thatcher, Blair, Cameron—The Long March of Neoliberalism 
Continues,” Soundings 48 (2011), 27. 
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chart that illustrates the “statistical correlation between poor social well-being and 
inequality.”19 Rogers-Vaughn equates this with “the spiritual level” of the societies.20 He 
concludes that the higher the income inequality, the worse health and social problems are. 
Other researchers offer even more damning data. Michael Marmot discovered that 
“individuals living in highly stratified societies have worse physical, psychological, and 
relational health, as well as higher mortality rates.”21 Furthermore, Marmot found that 
individuals in every class suffer more in more unequal societies, concluding, “where 
individuals live on the social gradient predicts their level of health.”22 So, not only does 
neoliberalization lead to greater inequality, it leads to greater human suffering of all types 
– including spiritual. 
Perversion of the Modern Soul 
 Neoliberalism thrives on the ethic and outputs of competition, yet “competition is 
not natural nor given,” writes neo-Foucauldian Wendy Brown.23 Foucault claims that 
mankind is not meant to live as competitive peoples: 
Competition is not the result of a natural interplay of 
appetites, instincts, behavior…the effects of competition 
are due only to the essence that characterizes and 
constitutes it…not to a pre-existing nature [but] to a formal 
privilege. Competition has an internal logic; it has its own 
structure. Its effects are only produced if this logic is 
respected. It is, as it were, a formal game between 
inequalities; it is not a natural game between individuals 
and behaviors.24 
 
                                                        
19 Rogers-Vaughn, Caring for Souls in a Neoliberal Age, 59. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 60. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Brown, Undoing the Demos, 62-3. 
24 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979 (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 120. 
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Thus, the neoliberal project is one orchestrated by the neoliberal state. There are three 
ways in which the hegemonic neoliberal state accomplishes its goals: via convention, 
intervention, and even subvention. 25  There is nothing natural about competition, yet 
mankind is subjected to the mantra and soft power of the neoliberal state. 
 The Weltanschauung of postmodernity has been criticized ever since Max Weber, 
for “it reduces the human, disenchants the world, and forecloses alternative values.”26 
Because neoliberal society has crafted homo oeconomicus (a fundamentally economic 
creature), grooming against the idea of the human as “fundamentally political, loving, 
religious, ethical, social, moral, tribal, or something else,” the economization of state and 
its docile citizens has taken place.27 
 The advent of postmodernity’s homo oeconomicus and the subsequent subdual of 
man’s natural homo politicus identity, Wendy Brown writes, “As human capital, the 
subject is at once in change of itself, responsible for itself, and yet a potentially 
dispensable element of the whole.”28 She reminds us that Weber and Karl Marx “assume 
a subjective interior that is disharmonious with capitalism…[made up of] subjective 
personhood bound to ideals of worth, dignity, self-direction, even soulfulness.”29 Brown 
expresses fear that dignity and soulfulness could be extinguished by neoliberalism’s 
continued construction of mankind in its image. 
 Pastoral theologian Bonnie Miller-McLemore theorizes that humans live in 
something called “the living human web.”30 The living human web exists in three levels: 
                                                        
25 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 131. 
26 Brown, Undoing the Demos, 79. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., 110. 
29 Ibid., 111. 
30 Bonnie J. Miller-McLemore, “The Living Human Web: Pastoral Theology at the Turn of the Century,” in 
Through the Eyes of Women: Insights for Pastoral Care, ed. J. Stevenson-Moessner (Minneapolis: Fortress 
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large collectives (institutions), smaller groups of face-to-face relations (friendships), and 
individuals. Political scientist William E. Connolly argues that neoliberalism engages 
itself in this web, disrupting vital human relationships. Neoliberalism succeeds in doing 
this through marginalization and corruption. 
 Rogers-Vaughn explains marginalization as a procedure neoliberalism reserves 
for restricting “the size, power, or scope of human systems within its hegemonic 
influence.”31 This eliminates competition. Corruption refers to how “neoliberal rationality 
transforms human systems to conform to its discourse, ideology, and agendas.”32 Because 
of marginalization and corruption, neoliberalism dominates the lives of individuals – 
creating a neoliberal culture of its own hegemonic creation. Within neoliberal 
communities, we witness the “methodical destruction of collectives.”33 Political scientists 
Robert Lane and Robert Putnam both correlate the erosion of communities with 
depression and a general loss of happiness. 
 One of the greatest harms committed by neoliberalism is to religion. ‘Spirituality’ 
is on the rise at the expense of religion. According to David Webster, “contemporary 
spirituality makes us stupid, selfish and unhappy.”34 The crumbling of organized religion 
is one example of how social systems are being attacked and mangled by neoliberalism. 
Novel forms of human misery have arisen out of the anti-institutional neoliberal society. 
Of course, before neoliberalism, there were far more regulations and institutions. In the 
wake of neoliberalism the fruits of a nation-state rot away. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Press, 1996), 9–26. 
31 Rogers-Vaughn, Caring for Souls in a Neoliberal Age, 69. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Essence of Neoliberalism,” Le Monde diplomatique [English edition] December 
1998. 
34 See David Webster, Dispirited: How Contemporary Spirituality Makes Us Stupid, Selfish and Unhappy 
(Winchester: Zero Books, 2012) 
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 People have left the pews in the name of individuality. Institutionalized religion 
itself has been replaced by a religion of the market. David Loy explains: 
The discipline of economics is less a science than the 
theology of that religion, and its god, the Market, has 
become a vicious circle of ever-increasing production and 
consumption by pretending to offer a secular salvation. 
…the Market is becoming the first truly world religion, 
binding all corners of the globe more and more tightly into 
a worldview and set of values whose religious role we 
overlook only because we insist on seeing them as 
“secular.”35 
 
Out of this secular exodus has come a major change in how people see the world, as the 
embrace of Market religion has led to cultural destruction à la ethnocide, or meaning 
destruction. “Significance no longer inheres in things; rather, meaning and significance 
are a property of minds who perceive meaning internally.”36 This has led people to live a 
“buffered” existence that is “insulated and isolated in its interiority.”37 The danger of 
individual insulation is personal isolation, which can have devastating effects on the 
spirit. 
 Furthermore, abandoning religion can lead to what many theologians fear is the 
greatest risk to society: idolatry. Nicholas Lash concludes, “the displacement of 
religion…leaves our propensity for idolatry unchecked and unconstrained, with 
devastating consequences.”38 The late Edward Farley believed idolatry to be the origin of 
human evil. Rogers-Vaughn synthesizes Farley’s theory: 
Once we identify some mundane person, place, thing, or 
state of being with the “eternal horizon,” he claims, we are 
                                                        
35 David R. Loy, “The Religion of the Market,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 65.2 (1997), 
275. 
36 James K. A. Smith, How (Not) to Be Secular: Reading Charles Taylor (Grand Rapids: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2014), 29. 
37 Ibid., 30. 
38 Nicholas Lash, The Beginning and the End of ‘Religion’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 110. 
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then prepared to sacrifice anything—self, others, creation—
to protect whatever we have made sacred. It does not 
matter, in this view, whether the idol is identified as 
“religious” or “secular.”39 40 
 
Neoliberal capitalism positions itself as an idol for all citizenry to worship through their 
transcendent appreciation of money. This proves detrimental for all – from the rich to the 
poor. 
Marginalization and Corruption 
 As people in the neoliberal society are made docile, their human relationships as 
homo oeconomicus and homo consumens disintegrate. Many neoliberal leaders like, 
Donald Trump, assert that their policies reinforce ‘family values’, but the data show 
otherwise. Marriage rates have gone down. Why? Because before neoliberalism took 
major strides in America, ‘love’ was a bigger factor in courtship than today where (under 
American neoliberalism) the profit or need motive has crept into the mind of many 
couples. 
 Sociologist Jorge Arditi suggests that “to love” is “to apprehend the other directly 
and entirely. It means that no social or cultural object lies between the lover and the 
beloved, that is, that no element of the intellect plays any part in the experience of 
loving.”41 This was the type of love that made marriage a lasting reciprocal institution. 
Now, late capitalism has promoted new individualism to the point where marriage is a 
contractual commitment for reciprocated self-benefit. 
 These now heavily individualized agents look to the market for emotional capital. 
Why risk love when one can buy numbness? Numbness can be found in consumer items 
                                                        
39 Rogers-Vaughn, Caring for Souls in a Neoliberal Age, 88. 
40 See Edward Farley, Good and Evil: Interpreting a Human Condition (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990) 
41 Eva Illouz, Cold Intimacies: The Making of Emotional Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 111. 
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that reinforce the cultural ideas of self-reliance, individualism, and personal 
responsibility.42 Consumerism is unfulfilling, and although it may claim to bring people 
together, it fails to do so. Neocolonialism renders rendezvous meaningless because they 
are about objects and not people. The great irony of neoliberalism is then that 
capitalism’s guarantee that greater consumer freedom leading to liberation and finding 
oneself, in fact, leads to less freedom and love for all involved. 
 There are real repercussions for a buffered existence. Rogers-Vaughn asks: How 
does one manage to remain flexible in adapting to the conditions of a world where 
institutions and relationships that sustain the self have waned, while also creating a 
coherent personal narrative that enables one to cope with these very conditions? 43 
Rogers-Vaughn points out that, “The defining feature of the therapeutic self is a narrative 
of personal suffering.”44 If one cannot narrate the suffering of oneself to another, how can 
empathy (a key aspect asked of humans in the human rights process) develop? Extreme 
individualism is at odds with having a healthy self. 
 Neoliberalism results in the radical alteration of the self, authenticity, and 
suffering of people. The marginalization and privatization of suffering have left people in 
a new kind of paralysis called “the new chronic.” 45  As hyper-individualized agents, 
neoliberal souls suffer alone. Wendy Brown has called the owned sufferings (property) of 
these solitary souls “wounded attachments.”46 Psychotherapy can help, but the deepest 
injuries to the spirit, according to Rogers-Vaughn, “require political as well as 
                                                        
42 Jennifer M. Silva, Coming Up Short: Working-Class Adulthood in an Age of Uncertainty (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 149. 
43 Rogers-Vaughn, Caring for Souls in a Neoliberal Age, 98. 
44 Ibid., 99. 
45 Cazdyn, The Already Dead, 2. 
46 Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1995), 52-76. 
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therapeutic responses.”47 Ann Cvetkovich argues that depression is how neoliberalism 
feels. Depression is a feeling of failure or learned helplessness, and when driven by 
neoliberalism, the citizen is “tired of having to become himself.”48 The citizen eventually 
turns to newfound addictions (i.e., opioid addiction, alcoholism, et cetera). Suicide and 
criminal pathologies can result from these rendered mental health statuses. 
 Rogers-Vaughn classifies postmodern suffering into three orders. The first is 
intrinsic to the human experience: illness, conflict, death, et cetera. Humankind must 
make sense of these issues until the end of time. Second-order suffering is: murder, 
violence, fraud, et cetera. These are troubles dealt with by disciplinary control. Third-
order suffering is the new normal and “entails the erosion of soul.”49 Rogers-Vaughn 
describes third-order suffering in his own words: 
Without strong, vibrant collectives to support them, 
individuals are more-or-less left to their own devices to 
deal with distress. We might describe them as in a state of 
spiritual homelessness. These unfortunate souls are 
abandoned, left to interpret their sufferings as signs of 
personal failure.50 
 
Rogers-Vaughn expects the new chronic to mutate and compound the pain of other types 
of social injustice. 
“Empire” 
 In 2000, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri published their neo-Marxist vision of 
what neoliberalism had set forth in postmodernity. They named the book Empire. The 
word ‘Empire’, intentionally capitalized throughout the book, serves as a persona for a 
                                                        
47 Rogers-Vaughn, Caring for Souls in a Neoliberal Age, 101. 
48 Ann Cvetkovich, Depression: A Public Feeling (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012), 4. 
49 Rogers-Vaughn, Caring for Souls in a Neoliberal Age, 171. 
50 Ibid., 126. 
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faceless entity that has manifested through neoliberal thinking. Empire is the name for 
postmodernity. Instead of a unipolar world order dominated by the United States, Hardt 
and Negri argue that the very ethos and logos of neoliberalism has set into motion a 
hegemonic entity independent of any singular state. 
 Since Empire’s release, many thinkers who attempt to put many modern 
phenomena into a single trope have applied ‘Empire’. One book that adopts the word 
describes Empire as: 
A particular formation of government and power and, given 
its pretense to be global, generates a ‘collective spirit’, an 
anthropological construction, that allows and approves of 
certain behaviours, reactions, feelings, and attitudes of the 
social and political actors, that shapes a certain logic and 
way of conceiving life, and that imposes and translates 
itself into values and a hegemonic Weltanschauung.51 
 
As one can see Empire provides a garish picture to the rather opaque problem of 
neoliberalism. 
 The Empire thesis can capture the micro problems of nonmaterial damage to 
victims under its rein, too. Empire, as it relates to human rights, is articulated best by 
Costas Douzinas. He writes that a human rights violation victim is: 
Someone whose dignity and worth has been violated…. 
Losing humanity, becoming less than human; losing 
individuality, becoming part of a horde, crowd or mob; 
losing self[-]determination, becoming enslaved; these are 
the results of evil, otherwise known as human rights 
violations.52 
 
Hardt and Negri often write in neo-Marxist terms of the multitude, similarly but 
differently from Marx’s masses. 
                                                        
51 Néstor Oscar Míguez, Joerg Rieger, and Jung Mo Sung, Beyond the Spirit of Empire: Theology and 
Politics in a New Key (London: SCM Press, 2009), 2. 
52 Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (London: 
Routledge-Cavendish, 2007), 69. 
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 Although Hardt and Negri’s Empire trope succeeds in describing a phenomenon, 
its raison d’être is false – argue Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose. Both students of 
Foucault, Rabinow and Rose write in their evaluation of Empire that, “For Hardt and 
Negri… biopower is an encompassing, totalizing term—biopower serves to secure the 
dominion of a global form of domination that they term ‘Empire’.”53 Hardt and Negri 
understand Empire’s power as something extracted from the multitude – like ‘surplus 
value’. This neo-Marxist view of biopolitics asserts that biopolitics is at the center of all 
politics. This interpretation of Foucault’s biopolitics is predicated upon an essay by 
Foucault’s protégé Gilles Deleuze who wrote that the world had moved from being 
influenced by disciplinary institutions (as Foucault explained) to being “immanent in the 
flexible, fluid and fluctuating networks of existence itself.”54 
 Neo-Foucauldians Rabinow and Rose object to the theory of Empire as expressed 
in terms of biopolitics because it fails to understand Foucault’s original usage of the term. 
“The concept of biopower – like that of discipline – was not trans-historical or 
metaphoric, but precisely grounded in historical, or genealogical, analysis.”55 In so far, 
Hardt and Negri used the term ‘biopolitics’ erroneously to express a single moment in 
politics that transpired (postmodernity), instead of as a continuous, analytical tool that 
Foucault intended. 
 I was able to interview theologian Gary Dorrien who has written extensively on 
social ethics and prefers not to use the word ‘neoliberalism’ nor ‘Empire’. The persistent 
status quo, he argues can reify and have its meaning tilted in one way or another if one 
names it. “Once you name, put a spirit on it, [then] it becomes [the] subject of predicates 
                                                        
53 Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose, “Biopower Today,” BioSocieties 1.2 (2006): 198. 
54 Rabinow and Rose, “Biopower Today,” 198.  
55 Ibid., 199. 
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and so on….”56  Dorrien asserts, “There is something mythological” about the terms 
Empire, neoliberalism, Zeitgeist, and Weltanschauung.57 He says it “can be/is evocative, 
illustrative, even illuminating…but you can only take it with a certain grain of 
seriousness literally.”58 The problem of essentialism seems to haunt discourse on the 
status quo. 
The Power of UNDRIP 
 Regardless of how you name or frame postmodernity, we are currently in an age 
of neoliberalism. It is neoliberalism’s nature to be totalizing. Neoliberalism aims for a 
single ideology, is fundamentalist in nature, and allows no room for debate because no 
one represents modern imperialism. In its commonality, neoliberalism’s whole acts as a 
guiltless, unconscious culprit, is an un-soulful entity (i.e., has no soul, no single identity, 
and cannot be a rights-holder or duty-bearer), is culturally hegemonic, and is the anti-
institution (i.e., anti-United Nations, anti-state), while speaking to become the institution 
at any cost, while avoiding accountability. Neoliberalism is a modern form of destructive 
cultural imperialism that now affects all people. Neoliberalism does not discriminate. It 
marginalizes and corrupts the weakest but also the strongest and everyone in between. 
 Taking from the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
of 2007 (UNDRIP) I select the articles and clauses that protect the indigenous human 
spirit from cultural imperialism and apply them to all humans because neoliberalism 
attacks the dignity of all peoples, not just indigenous peoples. 
                                                        
56 Gary Dorrien, “An Interview with Dr. Gary Dorrien,” interview by Alexander Sieber, February 7, 2018, 
audio, 39:00. 
57 Dorrien, interview 
58 Ibid. 
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 In Chapter 1, I investigate three cases that have worked to counteract the forces of 
neoliberal cultural imperialism. I advise a potential remedy rooted in international human 
rights. In Chapter 2, I introduce the case for the existence of souls, an explanation and 
defense of human spirituality and flourishing. Chapter 3 is a look at civil society as it 
relates to cultural rights. It asks: Can civil society contribute to the application of an 
expedient law? Chapter 4 investigates the practical matters of introducing new rights. It 
asks: What negative or positive effects would result from the expansion of cultural 
rights? Chapter 5 showcases the natural philosophy of Henri Bergson’s open society. And 
finally, Chapter 6 includes a synthesis of the paper. Concepts of emergence, becoming, 
imminence, and world-expansion stitch together these chapters. 
Chapter 1 | What Do the People Want? 
Introduction 
 In this chapter, I investigate cultural rights in the neoliberal era. In the timespan of 
three cases, I identify how neoliberalism has harmed people and how human rights have 
progressively curbed its effects. I suggest that one can learn from the most advanced 
human rights instrument, UNDRIP, to create new law that meliorates neoliberalism and 
its cultural imperialism for all, not just indigenous peoples. 
The Indigenous Rights Movement 
 Indigenous people have been anything but passive in the ethnocide and genocide 
committed against them. Broken treaties and the encroachment of colonialism on their 
lives have been met with resistance. First Nations are proud of their ‘sovereignty’ and 
have fought for their ways of life around the world – militarily in the United States, 
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Canada, and Mexico. But ‘the indigenous rights movement’ truly began when indigenous 
peoples of North America allied with the indigenous around the world. From 
Scandinavia, Russia, New Zealand, Australia, Guatemala, Brazil, Bolivia, Kenya, Japan, 
Philippians, Greenland, et cetera, indigeneity turned out to be as common as culture 
itself. 
 The quest to protect all indigenous peoples with a worldwide legal apparatus 
began in Geneva, Switzerland in 1982 when the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) “established the Working Group on Indigenous Populations with the mandate 
to develop a set of minimum standards that would protect indigenous peoples.”59 The 
Working Group found widespread marginalization, oppression, discrimination, and 
exploitation of indigenous peoples around the world. The Working Group subsequently 
drafted a declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples and submitted it to its parent 
body, the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities. The Sub-Commission submitted it to the UN Commission on Human Rights 
in 1994. 
 The Draft moved slowly through the United Nations (UN) system because of 
concerns by states regarding the right to “self-determination of indigenous peoples and 
the control over natural resources existing on indigenous peoples’ traditional lands.”60 
But eventually, on 13 September 2007, UNDRIP was adopted by a majority of 144 states 
in favor, 4 votes against (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States) and 11 
abstentions (Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, 
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Nigeria, Russian Federation, Samoa and Ukraine). 61  The four countries that voted 
against, eventually declared their support for the Declaration, as did Colombia, Samoa 
and Ukraine. 
 UNDRIP touched every corner of the globe and was seen then and remains seen 
as a victory for human dignity and international justice. By assigning group rights to 
indigenous peoples, the 46-article Declaration gave many indigenous peoples a lifeline. 
More specifically, it gave: access rights, autonomy rights, boarder-crossing rights, child 
welfare rights, citizenship and civic participation rights, compensation, consultation & 
free, prior, and informed consent, culture and language rights, disability rights, economic 
development rights, education, elders rights, environmental rights, equality, protection 
from forced assimilation, fundamental freedoms, freedom from genocide, health rights, 
housing rights, human rights, the right to indigenous identity, membership and citizenship 
rights, individual rights, right to intellectual property, labor and employment rights, land, 
territories and resources rights, non-discrimination rights, rights to their own legal 
systems, natural resources rights, women’s rights, the right to exist, social welfare rights, 
rights to compensation, et cetera.62 
 Because of their subjection to what James C. Scott calls the “symbolic 
manipulation, struggle, and conflict” of living on the margin, many indigenous peoples 
suffer tremendously from social stress.63 They come to understand colonization so well 
because they have felt colonization’s marginalization. A true neo-Foucauldian 
anthropologist, Scott records that those who live on the margin are disciplined and 
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punished. Furthermore, indigenous peoples collect information and are subsequently 
empowered with knowledge of colonialism through their experiences. They keep their 
oral histories as a genealogy of their people and of how their lifeworlds came to be 
impacted by colonial power – both hard and soft. Subsequently, indigenous peoples 
represent a tremendous asset to the rest of humanity. Through UNDRIP and indigenous-
specific bodies at the UN, as the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, indigenous 
peoples inform humanity to the perils of neocolonialism to human dignity. Respectively, 
I find it appropriate to refer to UNDRIP as an anti-colonial document. 
Finding Rights for All in UNDRIP 
 UNDRIP’s Preamble says, “All peoples contribute to the diversity and richness of 
civilizations and cultures, which constitute the common heritage of humankind” and that 
“Indigenous peoples are equal to all other peoples.” 64  It also champions indigenous 
peoples for organizing to “bring to an end all forms of discrimination and oppression 
wherever they occur.”65 Furthermore, article 2 of UNDRIP states, “Indigenous peoples 
and individuals are free and equal to all other peoples and individuals.”66 
 I argue that the UNDRIP Preamble supports the idea of human equality and a 
single human community. Bringing an end to all forms of oppression should also include 
protection against all forms of cultural oppression. In so far, human spirituality should be 
protected, as it is indubitably an aspect of culture. 
 Article 8 stipulates, “Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be 
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subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture.”67 Moreover, “States shall 
provide effective mechanisms for prevention of and redress for: Any action which has the 
aim or effect of depriving them of…their cultural values, and any form of forced 
assimilation or integration.”68 
 In the ways I described above, neoliberalism is a real threat to all culture. 
Neoliberalism is a totalizing refinement with no meaning attached to it, which defeats the 
purpose of culture – a meaning-giving schema. Cultural destruction has been seen before 
as ethnocide. Indigenous peoples know it well, and I believe UNDRIP could be read as a 
warning to the greater world community of imperialism’s often subtle coup. As I have 
described, neoliberalism is a form of cultural imperialism that forces assimilation and 
integration through singularizing people. 
 Article 11 states “Indigenous peoples have the right to practice and revitalize their 
cultural traditions and customs. This includes the right to maintain, protect and develop 
the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures.”69 Article 23 shapes perhaps 
the most applicable piece of UNDRIP, stating, “Indigenous peoples have the right to 
determine and develop priorities and strategies for exercising their right to development. 
In particular, indigenous peoples have the right to be actively involved in developing and 
determining health, housing and other economic and social programs affecting them.”70 
 Article 11 specifically refers to safeguarding culture. Putting culture into the 
hands of its people and giving rights-bearers the duty to protect their culture is something 
that the rest of society could incorporate in order to preserve and defend their culture. 
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Article 23 addresses development. In particular, it states that indigenous peoples have a 
say in how development affects them. This is the crux of neoliberalism: When can we 
draw the line as a society and say “No more”? 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 The Declaration provides in article 27.1 the first instance of universal protection 
of the right to participate in cultural life. Article 27.2 also says, “Everyone has the right to 
the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or 
artistic production of which he is the author.”71 I find article 27.2 has enormous potential 
against neoliberalism. Article 28 of the UDHR states that “Everyone is entitled to a social 
and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can 
be fully realized.”72 
 I interpret that articles 27 and 28 of the UDHR can both serve as protection 
against neoliberalism. If neoliberalism is morally degrading and neoliberal legal 
construction can be construed as a kind scientific production, article 27 could help serve 
to meliorate neoliberalism. I assert here that man-made law is a kind of technology – 
something that is often thought of as the application of scientific knowledge. I postulate 
that man-made law is therefore the application of scientific knowledge. In many cases, it 
is the science of how to regulate human behavior. In fact, when Foucault writes about 
biopolitics, he describes “techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the 
control of populations.”73 
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 Unfortunately, many states have declarations and reservations against Article 27, 
such as Belgium, China, France, Great Britain, India, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan, 
Russia, Sweden, et cetera.74 Article 28, if understood to have jurisdiction over modern 
global neoliberal imperialism, could make neocolonialism a central international concern. 
Perhaps these UDHR articles could protect cultural rights to spirit by meliorating 
neoliberalism, too. 
1981: Sandra Lovelace v. Canada 
 In Sandra Lovelace v. Canada, we recall that the Human Rights Committee 
invoked Article 27, ruling in favor of Mrs. Lovelace who was a native excommunicate 
from her tribal land for marrying a non-Indian male. Her tribe’s decision resulted in Mrs. 
Lovelace being separated from her community and family as well as from her culture. 
The decision was as per the Indian Act of 1876 between Canada and First Nations, which 
by its very existence was a colonial imposition because it defined the contours for what 
qualifies as Indian. The Committee found that a major disregarded loss to losing Indian 
status is “the cultural benefits of living in an Indian community, the emotional ties to 
home, family, friends and neighbors, and the loss of identity.”75 The Committee’s ruling 
states, 
Accordingly, the Human Rights Committee, acting under 
article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is of the view that 
the facts of the present case, which establish that Sandra 
Lovelace has been denied the legal right to reside on the 
Tobique Reserve, disclose a breach by Canada of article 27 
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of the Covenant.76 
 
 As S. James Anaya remarks, “The Lovelace case emphasizes the rights of the 
individual.” 77  Her case was an example of a person confronted by imperialism’s 
coloniality. Lovelace fought for her individual psyche to be saved by invoking the word 
“culture.” Culture is defined by UNESCO as the “set of distinctive spiritual, material, 
intellectual, and emotional features of society or a social group, and that it encompasses, 
in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, 
traditions and beliefs.”78 This frames the spiritual as part of a group right, which, at the 
same time, has profound significance for the individual, for his or her human rights. 
Coloniality 
 As a Kahnawake Mohawk and anthropologist, Audra Simpson has a unique 
understanding of coloniality. In Simpson’s “On Ethnographic Refusal: Indigeneity, 
‘Voice’ and Colonial Citizenship” she argues, “To speak of Indigeneity is to speak of 
colonialism and anthropology, as these are means through which Indigenous people have 
been known and sometimes are still known.”79 She reasons that: 
Like “race” in other contexts, “culture” was (and still is in 
some quarters) the conceptual and necessarily essentialised 
space that stood in for complicated bodily and exchange-
based relationships that enabled and marked colonial 
situations in Empire: warfare, commerce, sex, trade, 
missionisation. “Culture” described the difference that was 
found in these places and marked the ontological end-game 
of each exchange: a difference that had been contained into 
neat, ethnically-defined territorial spaces that now needed 
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to be made sense of, to be ordered, ranked, to be governed, 
to be possessed.80 
 
The very notion of culture has imperialism locked into it. Invading nations have 
colonized the very identity of indigenous peoples through blood quantum. 
 Under the fallacious, race-ranking 18th century anthropology of Immanuel Kant, 
the West came to know the indigenous as not fully human yet in some cases holding the 
capacity for salvation.81 Like for dogs or horses, it became rudimentary census law for 
indigenous peoples to be subjected to blood quantum. Blood quantum is a method of 
governmentality whereby an indigenous person must prove his or her indigeneity. As 
Foucault tells us, governmentality always stipulates that information about the right-
holder is transmitted to another authority (i.e., the ruling government). In the case of 
proving one’s indigeneity, blood quantum is used by governments to deplete – if not 
wipeout – the ownership of indigenous land rights. 
 Returning to Simpson’s article, Simpson puts forth the idea that the death of an 
indigenous culture is precisely what I described earlier: the end of cultural difference. 
Ethnocide appears to be the ultimate goal of invading and conquering nations. 
Assimilation is demanded of indigenous peoples. Simpson’s answer to that is to be 
unapologetically native through refusal. 
 Simpson describes institutions like blood quantum as “bizarre logics of 
recognition and residues of history structured and still structure (in part) the bodies and 
persons and personalities and cousins and friends and enemies that comprise my version 
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of Kahnawake.” 82  Tragically for indigenous peoples the coloniality, or residue of 
colonialism, is part of daily life. Resistance is found in asserting oneself, such as claiming 
indigeneity and saying: “No, I will not be erased.” 
 I have described neoliberalism as culturally imperialistic. The Sandra Lovelace v. 
Canada illustrates the strife of a woman faced with coloniality that pitted her against 
members of her own tribe. Similarly to how Simpson describes blood quantum status on 
her reservation, it was ‘purity’ that made an Indian and Indian in the minds of Indians – 
the result of which stems from Canada’s Indian Act. The ruling in Sandra Lovelace v. 
Canada of 1981 marked the beginning of a movement that was sensible to the coloniality 
factor. 
1997: Hopu & Bessert v. France 
 The second case I wish to mention, Hopu & Bessert v. France, came 16 years 
after the Lovelace ruling. Recall, the Tahitian people whose burial ground was threatened 
with demolition over the building of a luxury hotel complex. They saw this violation as 
an affront to their families, as the authors considered the “relationship” to their ancestors 
to be an “essential element of their identity and to play an important role in their 
family.”83 Also, recall that France had reservations against Article 27 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 84  that were sustained by the Human Rights 
Committee. 
 This case was unique in that it was a cultural rights case that did not involve, or 
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could not invoke culture due to the reservation of France to Article 27. Instead, the 
Committee appealed for the right to family, “that they consider the relationship to their 
ancestors to be an essential element of their identity and to play an important role in their 
family life.”85 Although there is no UN definition of ‘family’, the Committee recognized 
that different cultures have different concepts of family (i.e., nuclear, communal, 
ancestral) and ruled in favor of the Native Tahitians. But again, we see a member state 
defying the right to culture in its semi-autonomous territory, French Polynesia, and 
disregarding local indigenous courts. Hopu & Bessert v. France is an example of cultural 
exceptions in the international sphere, but it is also a reminder that the indigenous 
movement had gained the compassion of the UN. 
2017: Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Bill 
 The New Zealand Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Bill of 
2017 is an example of granting personhood and of honoring cultural rights. A river in 
New Zealand was granted personal legal status in order to protect it from corporations 
who enjoy similar rights and to put the land in the trust of local Māori communities who 
see a metaphysical tie to the river. Chris Finlayson, New Zealand Minister for Treaty of 
Waitangi Negotiations, admitted, “I know the initial inclination of some people will say 
it's pretty strange to give a natural resource a legal personality.” Finlayson says, 
according to the BBC. “But it’s no stranger than family trusts, or companies or 
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incorporated societies.” 86  This case exhibits a deliberate attempt to legally sidestep 
imperialist neoliberalism. 
 The Whanganui River Claims Settlement is also markedly different from the two 
other cases. The Anthropocene is “a nature so shot through with human impact that it is 
no longer nature at all, but a human-managed global ecosystem or a ‘new Earth’87 where 
humanity is directly producing nature in myriad ways.”88 Political scientist Rafi Youatt 
argues that the problem at the root of the Anthropocene is that it “conceptually insists on 
a world that has no political outside, to match a nature that it has now subsumed.”89 He 
argues that granting ‘rights for nature’ do not solve the problem of extreme 
environmental damage. Rather, “place- and culture-specific persons—that intersect land-
use conflict, indigenous politics, and international environmental politics” by motions 
like the Whanganui River Claims Settlement do a better job.90 
 Youatt identifies psychological (biological), ethical (moral), and legal (fictitious) 
personhood.91 He notes that these are rooted in notions that are “deeply culturally and 
historically marked.”92 Legal personhood can be given to natural persons (e.g., individual 
humans) and legal personalities (e.g., corporations). What counts is who gets a legal 
persona, that is, who is accepted by law as a person. As Foucault would insist we ask: 
Who is doing the talking? Under ‘rights for nature’, are people speaking for Nature; is 
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Nature even able to speak in court? Being voiceless is to be vulnerable in lawfare. 
 The view known as ‘iwi-Whanganui’, which preceded the Settlement, involves 
both human and non-human agency. Marisol de la Cadena concludes from her work with 
Quechua communities in Peru that human persons and items of nature ought not 
distinguish themselves in the first place. This is a challenge to the paradigm ontology of 
Western modernity, which culminates in perspectivism. Perspectivism is the view of 
animals, spirits, and other nonhuman persons as humans, who see us as nonhuman.93 
Once again the indigenous population has given the world valuable knowledge from the 
fringes of society. Who are we to ‘other’ nature? 
 The Māori people that reside along the Whanganui River feel a deep connection 
to it. They take pride and enjoy the mana whenua (rights to the land) as stewards.94 
Ordained by their deity, the local Māori have a duty to tend to their land, as do other 
Māori communities to their life-giving sources. Youatt ends his paper with the suggestion 
that International Relations “might begin to understand environmental governance more 
politically, involving multiple kinds of collective persons who may not be fully 
transparent to one another.”95 Again, indigenous knowledge, conceptions, and ways of 
life can inform the greater society on how to best protect and govern in the face of the 
Anthropocene. 
Recap 
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 Sandra Lovelace v. Canada, Hopu & Bessert v. France, and the Whanganui River 
Claims Settlement are three cases that illustrate how over the span of the neoliberal era, 
humanity’s reaction has been to cling to the soulful in existence in the hope of 
maintaining meaning. Put simply: the soulful is worth saving, and spirituality is a lifeline. 
Theologians Joerg Rieger and Kwok Pui-lan have called this phenomenon of resistance 
“theological surplus” – which springs out of the dialectic between the human ideologies 
of transcendent spirituality and the oppressive status quo. 96  Furthermore, one sees a 
reoccurring theme that the indigenous experience of cultural imperialistic colonialism can 
inform those threatened by neoliberalism’s cultural imperialism. The two look 
remarkably similar. It seems pertinent for one to consider applying indigenous peoples’ 
rights and knowledges to the rest of humanity’s predicaments. Humanity can learn from 
itself in the endeavor of meliorating neoliberalism. 
Chapter 2 | Brain Science, Philosophy of Mind, and the Spiritual 
Introduction 
 This chapter introduces the case for the existence of souls, an explanation and 
defense of human spirituality, and human flourishing. 
The Soul 
 Lenn E. Goodman and D. Gregory Caramenico write that souls are “active beings, 
as natural to us as the skin that marks a boundary between our bodies and their 
environment.”97 Our souls are what give us our dignity. Souls give us our capabilities, as 
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one must remember, “we are not complex machines.”98 Instead, souls make us persons 
“capable of building relationships with one another and of modifying our surroundings 
physically, socially, intellectually, and culturally.”99 One sees the links between existing 
rights and the spiritual. 
 René Descartes tried to explain dualism of the body and the self-evident soul.100 It 
took until 1949 when Gilbert Ryle coined the phrase “the ghost in the machine” to 
describe body-mind dualism as a ghastly hoax.101 In Ryle’s opinion, it is wrong to see the 
mind as a ghost in the body. Ryle, perhaps prophetically, said that the mind and body are 
one. His argument has prevailed in most circles to this day. 
 The soul or psyche is a trope for the “totality of the human mind, with its 
conscious and unconscious realms.”102 A soul is the name for “all that makes persons as 
such distinctive – our cognitive and affective, active, and creative, appetitive and moral 
capabilities.”103 Although psychology is the study of behavior, Goodman and Caramenico 
invite us to consider: “It is persons who exhibit self, agency, consciousness, and personal 
identity.” 104  A soul, it is now widely believed, “understands and undertakes and 
proclaims a personality.” 105  Souls can also influence the brain and, in the case of 
plasticity, even change the brain’s makeup. 
 Souls are, in part, made – self-made – not born. That is, souls develop. Freedom, 
spontaneity, and creativity confirm claims of ‘souls’. Neuroscience and cognitive 
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psychology help vindicate the belief in souls through the study of perception, 
consciousness, memory, agency, creativity, et cetera. For example, “self-understanding 
and reflection are attributes of the psyche, not processes of the brain.”106 True brain 
science seeks to investigate the interactions between the layered interface of brain and 
mind. 
 The study of agency for example, clearly shows that freedom needs self-
determination, and self-determination is freedom. Souls, Albert Bandura’s work suggests, 
are not given but grown.107 That is, they develop. He writes: 
The sensory, motor, and cerebral systems are tools people 
use to accomplish the tasks and goals that people use to 
give meaning to their lives. Through their interactional acts, 
people shape the functional structure of their 
neurobiological systems. By regulating their own 
motivation and the activities they pursue, they produce the 
experiences that form the neurobiological substrate of 
symbolic, psycho-motor, and other skills. Should people 
experience any loss or decline of their bodily systems, they 
devise alternative ways of engaging and managing the 
world around them.108 
 
The body does not break, but finds a way to keep going through its soular agency. 
Bandura’s work on agency found: 
Four components critical in effective action: (1) framing 
goals and the plans conducive to achieving them, (2) 
forethought, anticipating future scenarios so as to weigh 
opinions before pursuing a course of action (purposive 
action, then, does not magically reverse the causal order, as 
if goals somehow drew effects out of the future), (3) “self-
reactiveness,” active regulation of one’s actions (for “one 
cannot simply sit back and wait for the appropriate 
performances to appear”), and (4) self-reflectiveness, 
adjusting plans and even goals to changing circumstances, 
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including new social dynamics.109 110 
 
Bandura rejects the reductionist conception of the human because he sees the soul at 
work in experiments of effective action (agency). For most philosophers of mind and 
psychologists the soul’s existence is both unproven nevertheless undeniable. 
 Goodman and Caramenico argue that souls take root in acts of moral 
appropriation. Hundreds of studies confirm the central importance of autonomy in 
healthy human living. “Integrated or intrinsic motives, for example, are found to foster 
flexible, heuristic and creative activity. Heteronomy impedes it. Autonomy in 
relationships, not surprisingly, promotes mutual satisfaction and stability.” 111 
Furthermore, autonomy in relationships supports mutual reliance. 112  These studies 
underline the “psychosocial basis for the moral imperative to treat others…with the 
dignity of subjects rather than try to manipulate them as objects.” 113  Souls are thus 
achieved and not given. Their development requires support, as without this care and 
nourishment, “identities can be stunted or destroyed.”114 
 Neuroscientists are finding that brainwork cannot be adequately described 
electrochemically, because the actions of the person far outweigh the powers of its parts. 
Goodman and Caramenico write, “That’s why persons show life and sensibility, 
consciousness and agency when the atom cannot.”115 Embodiment enables a soul to arise 
from the workings of a brain. 
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 Brain plasticity, for example, can heal the brain. This process of changing the 
structure of the brain is not understood to be an effect of normal brain activity. What we 
are seeing here, according to Goodman and Caramenico, is “top-down rehabilitation 
working the brain and working with it, to rebuild it.”116 The authors assert, “There’s a 
person at work here, not just a brain.”117 Take for example meditation, playing music, 
sport, or repetitive craftsmanship. These involve “active engagement of the mind 
reaching out for control and guidance of the body.”118 Certainly, we are more than just 
mechanistic bodies, or as Michael Gazzaniga puts it: “We are people, not brains.”119 
Revisiting the Tahitian Burial 
 As Goodman and Caramenico write: 
The insistent interest in separate souls is usually an entry 
trap to talk about death. But human flourishing links up 
more naturally with life. The intimate nexus of souls with 
bodies grounds our case for the soul. It is through our 
embodiment that we live as individuals and members of a 
community.120 
 
There are researchers in the scientific community who argue that ‘soul’ is a term marred 
by its association with individual animal bodies. As members of the panpsychism 
movement, they state that a “vital materiality” runs between human and non-human 
matter. 121  Panpsychism is the meta-theory that all things have a level of individual 
consciousness – even stones. Panpsychists argue that the mirage of complexity and 
capabilities of ‘living’ organisms is what distracts us from the worldview that even the 
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‘lifeless’ things have a soul. One ought not declare what has a soul and what does not 
have a soul simply by how radically one’s fascination is spurred by the object in question. 
Panpsychism is a theory that not only recognizes the vibrancy in all matter but also sees 
all things as interconnected and interwoven in reality. 
 Regardless of where one stands in the debate on where a soul begins and ends, all 
can agree that a human burial ground is a place of reverence. It is a place where one 
honors the human dignity of deceased members who lived a life with varying degrees of 
humanity. And as Gilles Deleuze noted about Foucault’s writings, there is “a certain 
vitalism” wherein life is “the capacity to resist force” – meaning that death marks the end 
of resistance and capabilities, or ‘the soul’ as we came to know it.122 Whether souls live 
on or not after death is purely irrelevant to a humanistic understanding of souls, though to 
understand homo religious in tandem with modern neuroscience is to understand the 
meaning of the burial ground and the ruling of the Human Rights Committee. 
 The burial ground is a place to care for the psyche of the living. Robert A. 
Emmons writes, “Spiritual emotions such as gratitude, awe and reverence, love and hope 
are likely to be generated when people perceive sacredness in various aspects of their 
lives.”123 They are known as positive emotions because of their affects; positive emotions 
“appear to enlarge the cognitive context, an effect recently linked to increases in brain 
dopamine levels.”124 They also “broaden people’s mindsets” and “build and replenish 
critical personal and social resources, such as resilience, optimism, and social support.”125 
 It is fitting that the lagoon next to the burial ground is also a fishing area. Just as 
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the fish nourish the natives’ bodies, the presence of the burial ground nourishes the 
psyches of each generation. Nature is a nurturer and a reflection of dignity for the 
‘living’. Meaning is easily found in the burial ground case. Hopu and Bessert v. France is 
an often-overlooked example of egregious cultural rights violation to spirit. 
The Soulful Life 
 Although I have spoken about neoliberalism as a threat to a soulful life, I have not 
described the soulful life in detail. The soulful life is a life that maximizes freedom. 
Freedom is not absolute in life, as life is a continual power struggle. Free will is not 
entirely given, but it exists to varying degrees for different people. Yes, capabilities are 
important, but much of life is also spiritual. I will illustrate that they are interconnected 
together with our emotions, too. 
 Theologian Philip Clayton writes, “At its deepest, religion speaks the language of 
feeling and interiority; it valorizes the individual and the unique; it grasps the person only 
in her communion with the Whole, just as it intuits the Whole in each one of its parts.”126 
This generates the possibility of positive emotions. Yet, when spurred by love one can 
actually lose one’s freewill, such as being in a state of rapture, ecstatic babbling or erotic 
passion without law’s tethers. Loving is both an activity and an experience. 
Consequently, one can venture into uncharted territories while loving – by becoming, and 
subsequently lose agency. I argue that a person must be free to attain positive emotions, 
but ideally, not excessively free. Together with this claim, I wish to introduce Paul A. 
Kottman’s book Love As Human Freedom. 
 In his book, Kottman perceives “love as a fundamental form of human self-
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education.”127 That is, loving is how we make sense of the world. He argues that “love is 
also one way we teach ourselves that we are free and rational – capable of leading lives 
for which we are at least provisionally answerable and whose possibilities we open for 
ourselves, while taking on board all the accidents and misfortunes of life in the world.”128 
Kottman’s book is a genealogy of love, beginning with our ancestors’ love for the dead to 
abortion and modern birth control. For example, Kottman’s genealogy of love highlights 
the Atlantic slave trade, which was intelligible to people living under the Kantian 
anthropology but fell to a new regime of love once abolitionism became tenable.129 He 
considers moral progress stitched into the process of finding freedom through loving. 
Recall from Goodman and Caramenico, “self-understanding and reflection are attributes 
of the psyche, not processes of the brain.” Loving is therefore thought to be a soular 
activity, as interpreted through Kottman. Then, loving is by its very nature a humane 
exercise. Learning is an erotic process in itself, as Kottman writes, “Desire for 
understanding is manifestly erotic.”130 Or as Allen Ginsberg once said, “the best teaching 
is done in bed.” 
 Clayton and Kottman are not alone in their advocacy for human flourishing. 
Martha C. Nussbaum and Amartya Sen have advocated for human flourishing in their 
respective capabilities approaches.131 132 According to Kottman, one becomes freer by 
loving. According to Clayton, one becomes inspired and guided by love. I made note of 
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extreme freedom – stating that it can lead to loss in free will. Kottman never addresses 
extreme freedom as good reason for tethering the soul, yet it seems paramount in the 
genealogy of love. Yes, human loving is effected by understands and laws, but humanity 
also writes laws in the face of its own freedom. 
 For example, Augustine of Hippo refrained from sexual intercourse because he 
saw it as fundamentally sinful, that is, it is separation from God. The formerly unchaste 
Augustine had converted. Chasing erotic delight instead of the rapture of contemplation 
no longer interested Augustine. Of course, a broader interpretation of God as ‘love’ and 
‘union’ provide a different understanding. For example, many Sufis approach Allah as a 
lover. Again, new regimes of love come and go. For example, Isaac from the Hebrew 
Bible called his god “Fear.”133 Perhaps, one sees Kottman’s progression argument here: 
Loving has developed humankind, and the human has developed loving. Regardless, one 
can reasonably say that people who love more garnish greater capabilities. Love unbound 
would lead to greater humanity. 
 I was fortunate enough to have interviewed philosopher Akeel Bilgrami on the 
subject of human flourishing. I asked him: What do you make of the human flourishing 
argument? His response was: 
My view is that human flourishing should be seen not in 
terms of material prosperity…but should be seen as living 
an un-alienated life…. I feel that the idea of an un-alienated 
life is even more important than notions and ideas like 
liberty and equality. I think liberty and equality should be 
seen as a way of achieving an un-alienated life, otherwise 
liberty and equality are just social engineering.134 
 
He calls an un-alienated society and an un-alienated life a “deeper ideal” than liberty and 
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equality.135 
 Dorrien has a differing opinion. He said, “I think love is the whole point of 
spiritual life… it is freeing you from your bondage to your selfishness and the values of a 
commercial society that is constantly trying to make you just nothing but a consumer.”136 
It is through this practice that we become freed through “outward free moral care.”137 
Freedom, says Dorrien, is the “desire and capacity to do the good.”138 
 On the topic of self-determination – which is interrelated to cultural rights – chief 
drafter of the UDHR John Humphrey passionately wrote: 
The proposition (to begin by using a perfectly neutral 
word) that every people should freely determine its own 
political status and freely pursue its economic, social and 
cultural development has long been one of which poets 
have sung and for which patriots have been ready to lay 
down their lives.139 
 
This, I think captures the mystery and beauty that darkness and love evoke in 
humankind’s quest for what it calls ‘freedom’. 
Recap 
 As one grows increasingly aware of the science behind the mind, one begins to 
see the connections between our bodies’ health, development, freedom, self-
determination, and what we call our ‘souls’.140 Humans may not be completely free, but 
they have free will. Every docile life is subject to discipline and punishment from birth 
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through being, which renders a shaped life with a fashioned soul. In a sense, we are all in 
a battle to be free and to love (and perhaps even to be loved) – perhaps the most 
foundational way to maintain and generate freedom. As Clayton quotes Shakespeare’s 
Sonnet 116, “Love is to the star to every wandering bark, Whose worth’s unknown, 
through his height be taken.” Scholars agree that given a choice, a healthy soul (driven by 
desires such as love) pursues the soulful life, for to have the soul in chains is to 
counteract human flourishing – a positive theme at the heart of human rights theory. 
Chapter 3 | Civil Society and Cultural Rights 
Introduction 
 Consensus is important for the social change I, and others, envision. The last 
chapter was filled with information on the soul/psyche (something that is hardly a legal 
concept today) and even brains – which have underdeveloped consideration under 
international human rights law. 141  I assert that public opinion is central to any 
development of the law since the rule of law does not become thick at a local or 
international level until legitimacy is established among the people. Spirituality is 
something that we are all invested in. So, let us survey the topic of civil society. 
A Secular Soul 
 Legal scholar Michael J. Perry argues that there cannot be a secular notion of the 
sacred.142 Sacredness, he says, is inherently religious. In the wake of rulings like Sandra 
Lovelace v. Canada, Hopu & Bessert v. France, and the Whanganui River Claims 
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Settlement, I tend to disagree with Perry. Instead, I favor Ronald Dworkin’s assessment 
that sacredness can be a secular or deeply philosophical belief.143 Agnostics, atheists, 
deists, and theists are all spiritual. Certainly, they tend to be born into this world as 
spiritual beings, not religious beings. Most profoundly, all humans can believe in a 
humanistic rendering of the soul. 
 The humanistic rendering of the human soul – utilizable to the humanistic yet 
metaphysical language of the UDHR – is not necessarily concerned with the afterlife or 
lives previously lived. International human rights law has always been, and can only be 
concerned with present living humans. 
 Furthermore, I believe that law is a human construct that can be perceived as 
either glorifying or defiling something sacred – like God’s will, revered time, space, 
sound, or matter. This does not mean that all must adhere to a faith, nor is there one faith 
in the law. Instead, it means that law is by nature pluralistic and inherently secular. States 
may purport to apply a divine law, but ultimately they are applying a human 
interpretation of the received law. Contrary to Perry’s claim that there can be no secular 
notion of the sacred, I argue that the law itself is secular. Law merely serves to augment 
certain behaviors and norms. The three cases I highlighted demonstrate that sacredness 
can be a secular or deeply philosophical belief. 
 Sandra Lovelace v. Canada is an example of protecting dignity to maintain the 
ideals expressed by Jeremy Waldron. Waldron writes, “the modern notion of human 
dignity involves an upwards equalization of rank, so that we now try to accord to every 
human being something of the dignity, rank, and expectation of respect that was formerly 
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accorded to nobility.”144 The court’s ruling salvaged Mrs. Lovelace’s dignity because she 
had lost a basic rank. Lovelace’s status dropped to the point where her culture was 
compromised. There is nothing religious about the ruling – only a philosophical argument 
that all people ought to be treated with dignity – a human construct in its own right. The 
same goes for Hopu & Bessert v. France and the Whanganui River Claims Settlement. 
Foucault in Iran 
 Many forces have squeezed civil society thin over the past few years and 
therefore the power of the people. Authoritarian neoliberal political encroachment, rising 
corporate power, and organizational failures have weakened political movements. Non-
governmental organizations, various social movements, and religious movements remain 
routes to change. 
 Running parallel to the shrinking of civil society is the disenchantment of the 
postmodern world. Modernity, as Weber predicted, has fallen into a state of accelerated 
modernism and diminished spirituality. So is true for postmodernity today. Late in his 
life, Foucault had taken up the issues of civil society, protesting, and revolution. This 
included his famous correspondence from Iran during the Islamic Revolution. 
 Foucault was fascinated by what he called a political spirituality among the 
Iranian revolutionaries. He noted an “absolutely collective will” among the people of 
Tehran.145 Foucault describes “an absence of fear and an intensity of courage, or rather, 
the intensity that people were capable of when danger, though still not removed, had 
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already been transcended.”146 The people had a clear vision for what they wanted Iran to 
become without having the notion of progress. Foucault saw the Revolution as proof that 
it is possible to transcend “the spiritless world modernity has instituted.”147  Political 
spirituality is then “a force that asserts itself in a continuous enchantment of history.”148 
This means that political spirituality is an alternative to historical determinism. The 
Iranian revolutionaries had proven to Foucault that Kant’s concept of enlightenment was 
wrong. 
 Foucault praised the Revolution for bringing the spiritual to politics, but chiefly 
for the one-dimensional path with which the revolutionaries moved. There was no 
preconceived notion of what was going to be done. It was a swift process of not looking 
forward towards modernity or backwards to a bygone Islamic state. Instead, the 
revolutionaries expressed negation, shouting “The Shah Must Go!” 149  The Iranian 
revolutionaries typified what Foucault envisioned as homo politicus. Foucault’s vision of 
the Iranian people is of a society overcoming the plights of modernity with political 
action fueled by a pure political spirit. 
A Public Philosophy? 
 What is the best method for ameliorating neoliberalism for all? Brown writes that 
altering higher education would help,150 while Hardt and Negri theorize that the multitude 
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can counter global hegemony.151 I contend that amending higher education can only go so 
far in achieving this goal. It may be a positive transformative motion, but imagine the 
many people who do not have the opportunity to attain a higher education. They would 
likely be only passively be affected by the motion. What about a public philosophy? Can 
it revitalize civil society and re-enchant our world? 
 Before any heroic revolution like Hardt and Negri’s, or even the Islamic 
Revolution according to Foucault, there needs to be a general consensus from a social 
movement for it to remain lasting. This is developed through civil society. I asked 
Bilgrami: What is the best method to solve the spiritual deficit we face in neoliberal 
society? He answered: “I do not think we will get anywhere within neoliberalism, we 
have to transcend it.”152 He explained, that this is accomplished through a movement, not 
by law. He continues: 
I do not think you can get the state to do anything without 
forcing them to do it through movements. The state is very 
much behind neoliberalism. And unless there are 
movements out in the streets, I do not believe you will be 
able to combat neoliberalism.153 
 
Bilgrami favors social and political movements that engage in what he calls “the old 
wisdom of organizing” of Marx, Mahatma Gandhi, et cetera.154 Bilgrami admits his own 
pessimism, but says, “You need a lot of imagination to get people mobilized…. It is a 
very difficult issue.”155 Pessimism, he says, is not the way to bring neoliberalism to a 
terminus. 
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 Dorrien feels similarly to Bilgrami on how to combat neoliberalism. Dorrien says, 
“I do not think we can do much of anything individually…. I do believe in solidarity 
politics.”156 That is, Dorrien believes in creating structures that are not complicit in the 
neoliberal consumer paradigm. An advocate in his own right, Dorrien explains: 
I do think a decision to be involved in that kind of work, 
and then sustaining the hope the drive that keeps you in it 
starts with something personal before political or even 
spiritual. You are speaking to personal hopes and 
fears…capacities for being able to imagine a different 
world…holding onto it, not giving up.157 
 
Dorrien also points out what he calls “the hope problem.”158  When asking how one 
sustains hope for liberation from neoliberalism, “The ones that stay in it tend to have 
some kind of religious wellspring in their lives. They do not think that their success is 
what justifies the work. They really are faithful to something. And then their hope is 
continually renewed by spiritual practices.”159 
 Dorrien firmly believes in community organizing and dialogue. He said, against 
pure politics: 
I do not think that that sustains, I think [there is] something 
evasive about that, and it does not sustain the best kind of 
human rights activism, it does not sustain the best kind of 
theory…. I think that to keep this going, for human rights 
theory and politics and organizing to get to the next phase; 
you have to allow people to discuss and debate and 
therefore risk what gets risked when you join in a 
conversation about what is truly valuable to you.160 
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He also believes in a political response. “Politics is unavoidable work. It is constitutive in 
the struggle for justice.”161 He explained that justice movements are a “layered thing.”162 
 I contend that law gives society something concrete to organize towards and is the 
highest form of norm, so abridging law is perhaps what we should be working towards. 
Since neoliberalism has been critiqued ad nauseam with no fundamental critique to show 
for it, now may be the time to discuss how to ameliorate neoliberalism for everyone 
through law. In the meantime, a public philosophy – for the reasons expressed by 
Bilgrami and Dorrien – remains essential. 
 The premise of public philosophy is that there is no initially proposed solution to 
timely issues. Instead, there is, albeit ideally, dialogue engaging all parts of society. In a 
neoliberal world, we have even within a single nation pronounced division between rich 
and poor. This leads one to ignorance and a lack of empathy for one’s fellow citizen. And 
as Brown tells her readers, ideally the public needs to be both interested and informed.163 
I think dialogue is vital in establishing and maintaining true community, but I also 
believe that my legal remedy should be considered, since public philosophy may be a 
healthy yet too slow of a practice to resolve the ills created by neoliberalism. 
 I liken the present situation to a triage procedure. In the operating room one must 
make an evasive measure when required or else one loses the patient. Society can be lost 
to fascism, autocracy and other forms of authoritarianism. As Douzinas explains: 
If the formal freedom of legal rights has been accompanied 
closely by domination, formal equality has been shadowed 
by various types of oppression such as economic 
exploitation, social marginalization and cultural 
worthlessness…. When daily survival is the order of the 
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day, all aspirations for social improvement or cultural 
expression are extinguished. The oppressed cannot enjoy or 
even aspire to a fulfilled life which would allow their 
personality to flourish and be recognized in its complex 
integrity.164 
 
The reality of most neoliberal society is that people are simply too disempowered or 
voiceless to engage in a fruitful pubic philosophy. If spaces for public dialogue and 
contemplation were available, very few citizenries would even show up. For example, if a 
significant portion of household members work over 40 hours a week in addition to 
having children, a fair and meaningful public philosophy cannot take place. This is 
precisely how modern capitalism undermines civic involvement. For example, voter 
turnout is abysmal in the United States not just because of voter disillusionment. In fact, 
voting is, according to Hannah Arendt, one of the last remaining powers that citizens 
have the illusion of holding. It is instead that America’s public is so economized that it 
simply does not vote. 
 I argue that one ought not dispose of the idea of a legal measure being the end 
goal of a movement. Although it may not completely unhinge neoliberalism, a cultural 
rights movement could be a viable goal. That was how UNDRIP was started. It can be 
done again. 
Recap 
 As I asserted, a soul can be discussed in purely secular terms. I also illustrated 
why a law is always secular, despite assertions made to the contrary. Also, I introduce 
Weber’s critique of modern humankind’s disenchantment. Citing Foucault’s 
correspondence from Tehran, I show how politics can make life enriching. Not only can 
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the pursuit of politics give meaning in an authentic cultural sense, but also their pursuit 
can provide us the end to overcome postmodernity. I also argue that society would 
benefit from public philosophy, yet public philosophy’s slow course may not answer the 
dire needs of a world inflicted with neoliberalism. I contend that a legal measure is 
crucial to meliorate global neoliberalism. 
Chapter 4 | Adding Rights and Governmentality 
Introduction 
 Foucault tells us that life is inherently political. To remain or become free requires 
a political life. Humans are inherently political but not necessarily able. As I have 
described: freedom needs self-determination, and self-determination is freedom. Thus, 
the spirit of a person is a requirement for self-determination. This is why so many 
indigenous peoples who have been denied self-determination describe themselves as 
“broken.”165 The will of those persons is literally taken away with the spirit of a person 
and the culture of a group. 
 In this chapter I take a closer look at governmentality and how adding rights can 
be both good and bad for the people who benefit from the new law. In other words, I look 
at how greater cultural rights protection may empower people while simultaneously 
subjecting them to disempowerment. 
Every Society… 
 Every society must choose its intellectuals. When reading classical political 
theory texts this maxim comes into reprieve. In Machiavelli’s medieval work The Prince 
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and in Carl Schmitt’s more contemporary writing Political Theology, one sees society’s 
intellectual par-excellence as a single person. In his book Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes 
conceives of an apparatus that would bind peoples together by social contract. In many 
ways, governmentality entails trusting the state with the morals of its government. In 
representative government, such as the one described hypothetically in Plato’s The 
Republic, those with dignitas – the uniquely Roman understanding of dignity – rule as 
intellectuals; they were thought to be the most learned and free men. Plato dreamed that 
every man and woman existed in a class society, in which people had no electoral power 
over the selection of the state’s intellectuals. 
 Government, writes Mitchell Dean, is “intensely moral in that it seeks to engage 
with how both the ‘governed’ and ‘governors’ regulate themselves.” 166  Government 
involves not just “how we exercise authority over others, or how we govern abstract 
entities such as states and populations, but also how we govern ourselves.”167 How we do 
so is subject to moral questions. For this reason Dean says, “government is an intensely 
moral activity.”168 
 Governmentality not only affects imaginary entities like ‘the state’, it also crafts 
the practices that “try to shape, sculpt, mobilize and work through the choices, desires, 
aspirations, needs, wants and lifestyles of individuals and groups.” 169  As one can 
imagine, the power of governmentality could be used for good or evil. It can lead to the 
negation of freedom, or the protection of souls. Adolf Hitler’s adage, “thinking exists 
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only by virtue of giving or executing orders” 170 show governmentality’s ability to serve 
totalitarian regimes, whereas the UN’s stated objective is far more benevolent.171 The 
question for this thesis is now: What kind of consequence would claiming right to spirit 
have in terms of governmentality? 
Governmentality’s Dark Side 
 Human rights are international agreements between nations that require a duty-
bearer (such as the government) and a rights-holder (in this case an individual of the 
citizenry or a collective). Negative rights say what the government may not do to a 
citizen. Positive rights are what the government owes one. Cultural rights are positive 
rights and negative rights. Above all, rights maintain freedom, peace, and security. This is 
the classical relationship of government and its people in terms of governmentality. 
 In this day and age governmentality carries with it costs. That is, adding 
additional rights will have a potential drawback to the rights-holder. Whenever you set up 
a system of government, you are simultaneously setting up an information-gathering 
system that collects information from the population to the government. Any 
‘information’ a government requires of its people, such as blood quantum or racial 
identification, is of human construction and can be intentionally or unintentionally used 
against citizenry. It depends on the regime, but racial identification is an example of what 
can happen when government asserts its power over individuals in the process of 
governing whereby the citizens are subject to either benign purpose or invidious purpose. 
 There is another more inherent Continental philosophical criticism of rights 
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expansion. At one point in his studies, Foucault theorized a tradeoff between freedom and 
rights holding – what Douzinas calls Foucault’s law. Douzinas writes, “In a strange and 
paradoxical twist, postmodern societies follow what one could call ‘Foucault’s law’: the 
more rights we have the more insecure and unfree we feel.”172 This comes from a lengthy 
Freudian analysis that humankind makes rights because it desires to be loved, and that 
such desire can never be quenched. This could be true for rights that are not based on true 
human dignity. So what is the basis for cultural rights? 
 Waldron summarizes Dworkin’s thesis in Taking Rights Seriously succinctly. He 
writes that Dworkin argues: 
Anyone making a case of any sort in law makes it in the 
tones and language of rights, in the mode of entitlement 
rather than request or lobbying. A party in law does not 
phrase his argument in terms of its being a rather good 
idea to require a defendant or respondent to pay such and 
such a sum of money; he stands on his rights and in 
recognizing this standing the law accords him the dignity of 
a right-bearer.173 
 
Dworkin is saying that a law – such as the cultural right to spiritual dignity – must stand 
on dignity and not just a normative claim. In Chapter 1 I discussed the legal prescient of a 
right to spirit based on a concept of dignity that existing human rights norms define. 
The Promise of Governmentality 
 “Rights are tools and strategies for defining the meaning and powers of 
humanity.”174 Martin Heidegger thought one’s highest dignity is one’s capacity to open 
new worlds and possibilities through what he called world disclosure. According to 
Heideggerians Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Spinoza, “Our nature is to be world 
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disclosers. That is, by means of our equipment and coordinated practices we human 
beings open coherent, distinct contexts or worlds in which we perceive, feel, act, and 
think.”175 World disclosure refers to a process, which occurs at two different levels. He 
refers to: 
The disclosure of an already interpreted, symbolically 
structured world; the world, that is, within which we 
always already find ourselves. At another level, it refers as 
much to the disclosure of new horizons of meaning as to 
the disclosure of previously hidden or unthematized 
dimensions of meaning.176 
 
I argue that human rights work effectively as a transformative, world-building process. 
 According to Ben Golder’s Foucault and the Politics of Rights, Foucault thought 
of rights as a political tool, but like phenomenologists explain, every tool has a cost and a 
benefit. In Foucault’s words, “My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything 
is dangerous.”177 Foucault also argues that there is such a thing as a relational right. He 
explains: “The relational right is the right to gain recognition in an institutional sense for 
the relations of one individual to another individual, which is not necessarily connected to 
the emergence of a group.”178 Foucault’s relational right is a right of recognition between 
individuals that leads to greater understanding of equal humanity by bringing people 
closer together in a transformative, emergent way. This is how empathy is grown among 
humans. Cultural understanding improves under a high disclosure regime. 
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 Golder makes clear that for Foucault, human rights are groundless, but he sees in 
Foucault’s work an appreciation for rights that he calls “democratic potential,” or “a 
source of political promise and open-ended possibility.”179 To Foucault, rights have a 
form; they are both emancipatory and regulatory. So rights can be at once liberating, but 
through institutionalization, become the vehicle for enslavement back to another 
persecutory construct. Rights are tools of struggle to Foucault – one that becomes 
unpredictable, un-circumscribed, or uncontrolled once implemented. For example, being 
protected for being a woman, does some harm in that it frames the individual according 
to its sexuality. Liberation is not guaranteed. Freedom is the necessary precondition of 
power, but everywhere there is power, there is domination, and in this complex, there is 
constant change. This means that any liberal institution (i.e., the human rights regime) 
immediately ceases to be liberal. Foucault makes the bold claim that “it can never be 
inherent in the structure of things to guarantee the exercise of freedom. The guarantee of 
freedom is freedom…Freedom is a ceaseless work without any guarantee.”180 Brown and 
other neo-Foucauldians have expounded this political worldview. The question remains: 
What kind of potential would extending cultural rights from UNDRIP to the rest of 
humanity hold? 
Recap 
 Government is one way of commanding and ensuring morality in society. 
Governmentality can be a force for good or evil. Government protects all human rights, 
but under the wrong administration, governmentality can become malevolent. I make the 
case that there are also significant positive aspects to granting new human rights. 
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Foucault argues that in a life of constant struggle one must have a relational right. Only 
then can there be an emancipatory aspect to rights. The human right to spirit benefits 
from this right to dignity, as without it there may be perpetual chaos, including slavery. 
Chapter 5 | Rebuilding Community with Individuality?  
Introduction 
 In this chapter, I bridge the themes of world disclosure, emergence, imminence, 
and world-building from previous chapters to foretell what may become of humankind 
with a stronger cultural right to spirituality. I do so by introducing Alexandre Lefebvre’s 
recent interpretive work on philosopher Henri Bergson’s theory of the open society. 
Deleuze on Human Rights 
 Deleuze said that human rights introduce transcendence into political thought and 
practice. He saw this as a serious shortcoming. Deleuze defines transcendence as “the 
immanence of one term to another.”181 Immanence is always produced by transcendence, 
and transcendence is totalizing to any and all life. For Deleuze, a human right inhibits 
movement and becoming, because it works with a fixed kind of subject. 
 Lefebvre defines a human rights abuse as “the human being stripped of all his or 
her (or rather, its) particular qualities.”182 He writes that: 
By peeling away a specific set of qualities, we reach a 
general human core. Conversely, by adding a specific set of 
qualities to this core, we reach an embodied individual. In 
this scheme, the subject of human rights is at once general 
(sharing with all others a common core humanity) and 
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particular (individuated by a set of attributes).183 
 
Referring to Deleuze’s precepts, Lefebvre writes that, “A theory of human rights faithful 
to immanence must, therefore, address the problem of how to see and protect human 
universality beyond the transcendent generality of the subject.”184  Lefebvre turns his 
attention to Bergson’s philosophy of human rights, which closely resembles Deleuze’s 
full immanence view of human rights. 
Bergson on Human Rights 
 Bergson was a French philosopher who applied insights from Western science, 
especially biological evolutionary theory, to moral philosophy. According to Clinton 
Curle, Bergson had a profound influence on John Humphrey – a main drafter of the 
UDHR. Curle writes, “John Humphrey kept a journal of his private thoughts during his 
early tenure at the United Nations. From these journals, it is apparent that he came to 
view the Universal Declaration in terms of Bergson’s book The Two Sources of Morality 
and Religion.”185 Bergson’s early contribution to the idea of universal human rights came 
before Foucault’s, and I believe it is worth mentioning because Bergson enables us to 
have a macro vision of human rights. Contrary to Michael Ignatieff’s186 or John Rawls’187 
view that “human rights are purely a political instrument designed to protect individuals 
and attempts to identify a foundation for them are divisive, violent, and ultimately 
ineffective,”188 Bergson provides a scientific theory of human rights. 
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 Bergson’s theory of human rights is unique because it recognizes biological life. 
As Lefebvre explains Bergson’s understanding, “Human rights are not simply in the 
business of protecting life; they are an expression of life.”189 Bergson sees biology, or 
life, as having two tendencies: closure and openness. That is to say, humans and their 
societies can be (in varying degrees) closed or open. 
 Contrary to most evolutionary theories, Bergson believes that “morality is a 
product of evolution and not a check on it.”190 In fact, he holds that “we are naturally 
sociable, cooperative, and other-regarding beings.” 191  Such is humankind’s ‘open 
morality’. Bergson reasons that there is an evolutionary advantage to openness. Moral 
qualities such as empathy, cooperation, reciprocity, and solidarity are therefore not 
extrinsic to our evolved nature, but a product of it.192 Bergson asserts that humankind is 
naturally good. 
 ‘Closed morality’ is then something that “leads to an especially noxious form of 
moralism and hypocrisy: in refusing to acknowledge the problem of closed morality 
directly and sincerely, we tend to issue moral and political promises that will not be kept 
in moments of crisis.”193 Closed morality can lead to persecution and an unjust status 
quo. Closed morality is inferior to open morality. Bergson’s supports human rights to 
overcome humankind’s dark-sided, closed morality, which means creating an open 
society. 
 The closed-minded morality of a closed society threatens to disenchant and 
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enclose all human beings – not just the citizens of the closed society. Because of 
imminence and the emergence between societies, other societies are also affected by the 
closed society. Although there are positive aspects to the closed society, Bergson says 
that such a society crowds out joyful affects and passions – losing potential for society 
and individuals alike, as it pits the people against its society. Such crowding out can lead 
only to self-centeredness and self-preservation. As Bergson writes, “At once individual 
and social, the soul here moves round in a circle. It is closed.”194 In the close society, 
things stagnate and become mundane. 
 Bergson says that a consequence of a closed society is an ineffective and 
moralistic human rights institution. When in a time of crisis, the closed society buckles 
and fails to honor its promises. Bergson believed that persons of all peoples and societies 
are harmed or trapped by closed societies where people are “self-satisfied…greedy in 
spirit and flabby in mind, who wants to have his ethical cake and eat it too.”195 Just think 
of the inscription on the Statue of Liberty196 and America’s closed history of immigration 
policies starting with Asians during the Yellow Scare, Jews during the Second World 
War, “Hispanics”197 on several occasions, and now Muslims. That stagnant nation is 
guilty of being closed in mind and deed. 
 An open society, on the other hand, can generate joy and love. Bergson’s idea is 
not new. Adam Smith spoke about rippling circles of sympathy. Richard Rorty wrote on 
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concentric circles of relations of people like us to people not like us. 198  And more 
recently, Lynn Hunt has written on a cascading logic of human rights that will eventually 
cover all of humanity.199 
Bergson and Joy 
 Bergson draws from Christianity and Romanticism when he writes on joy. Adam 
Potkay explains the difference: 
This paradox characterizes discourses of joy both in their 
religious modes – ‘‘entering into the joy of God’’ is losing 
oneself and/or exalting oneself – and in their Romantic re-
modeling: losing oneself in nature and the current of 
humanity may be the same as projecting oneself there. The 
paradox of joy involves the nexus of loss and restoration, 
self-dispersion and perfect concentration, we so often find 
in human utterances about joy.200 
 
Bergson sees a qualitative difference between pleasure and joy. Joy is the perceiving and 
then partaking in “reality invented before our eyes”201 – a reprieve from everyday life. 
Pleasure is found in a different setting. Pleasure is manifest from science, whereas joy is 
found in philosophy. 
 Bergson asserts that joy, self-knowledge, and self-creation are strongly linked. As 
free biological entities, humans participate in the “creation of self by the self, the 
enlargement of personality by an effort that can draw much from little, something from 
nothing, and add unceasingly to the riches that already exist in the world.”202 Bergson 
praises self-creation as a way of overcoming a closed moral regime. 
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 Bergson is also a believer in benevolence and charity, that is, “abundance, 
muchness, overflowing, and dispersion” – much like Hunt’s description of human 
rights.203 Bergson attributes these qualities to humankind’s natural drive. 
Bergson and Love 
 The attitude of a closed soul is very different from that of an open soul. The open 
soul, we are reminded, has repercussions that spread to all existence. There are thus such 
things as ‘open love’ and ‘closed love’. Open love is like the pure marital love described 
by Arditi204, whereas closed love is tied up with attachment to objects. Closed love 
sharply resembles the love of modern hyper-individualized people who endure third-
order suffering. Love to Bergson is then “a mood or disposition of exaltation and 
welcome.”205 
 According to Bergson’s theory, human rights work negatively, as they “protect 
against the ravages of closed love. They codify and enforce love. Positively, they can 
initiate us into the form of life Bergson calls love. The intimation of love by human rights 
may serve as an introduction to it.”206 Is this the kind of reinvigoration society has been 
aimlessly looking for since Weber’s critique? Indeed, Bergson saw potential in human 
rights to be a crystallized and actualized doctrine and institution of love. He believed 
human rights carried with them evangelical inertia that could bring all of humanity and 
life to openness. The ideology of human rights – thought Bergson – could be open and 
eternal. 
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Relating Human Rights and Joy 
 Joy is a superior to pleasure to Bergson because of his philosophic biology. 
Pleasure, explains Lefebvre, “is only a contrivance devised by nature to preserve life…. 
But joy always announces that life has succeeded, gained ground, conquered…. The 
richer the creation, the deeper the joy.”207 Joy spurs us, and to Bergson, joy is a sign that 
our human destiny is being reached. Lefebvre says that the destiny of human rights is an 
“ongoing and unforeseeable creativity.” 208  Insofar, Bergson has a virtually limitless 
human rights utopia in mind – one far more optimistic than Samuel Moyn’s. 
 Finally, the joyful creation of the self by the self is becoming oneself. Joy is found 
in beginnings and creations. Human rights are then “works of love” that serve to pledge 
others under the open regime with the end goal of recruiting all human beings into 
love.209 Human rights work is both an individualistic emancipator and a society builder. 
Bergson writes: 
Humanity groans, half crushed beneath the weight of its 
own progress. It does not sufficiently realize that its future 
is in its own hands. It is up to humanity to see if first of all 
it wants to keep on living. It is then up to it to ask whether 
it wants merely to live, or whether in addition it wants to 
make the necessary effort required for fulfilling, even on 
our refractory planet, the essential function of the universe, 
which is a machine for making gods.210 
 
Pessimism haunts modernity’s Zeitgeist or Weltanschauung. Heidegger of course 
famously distrusted technology, and Schmitt rejected human rights altogether. It is 
fascinating to read Bergson because of his optimism. He foresaw a world immersed in a 
natural politics moving towards utopia. The authors of Empire struggle to see such a 
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thing anymore – as do critical theorists. Postmodernism foresaw the use of alternative 
facts in an everyday fight for objective truth. Perhaps international lawmakers should be 
reading Bergson – a person I believe would support crafting more human rights, because 
they would mean a greater civil society, lead to justified governmentality, and be bathed 
in untold spirituality. This would all result, according to Bergson, in a building of world 
community through a healthy relational individuality. 
Recap 
 Bergson’s theory of human rights illustrates how an open society can create a 
transformative world-building action for citizens and a fuller society. Through 
immanence, humankind can transform its world by applying substantive human rights 
law. The open society envisioned by Bergson requires human rights law to spur humanity 
towards a kind of love and joy that would otherwise not be possible. Through 
charitableness – a kind of evangelical action – emergence and becoming spread joy and 
love. Perhaps, my measure can spur the kind of spiritual awakening that gets modernity 
out of dejection. 
Chapter 6 | Concluding Remarks 
 In this thesis, I asserted – based off of the preamble to UNDRIP – that there is a 
single human community, and that all forms of oppression – including cultural and 
spiritual oppression – should be safeguarded by human rights. UNDRIP is the most 
advanced human rights instrument to affirm a people the right to preserve, develop and 
control manifestations of its culture. My postulate of a single world community, together 
with the affirmation to preserve, develop and, express and control one’s own culture, 
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suggests that this right should be universal. Article 15.1.a of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights vindicates this, as it states, “The States Parties 
to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone: To take part in cultural life.”211 
This basic right could help prevent peoples’ cultures from being swallowed up by global 
neoliberal capitalism. 
 Furthermore, UNDRIP grants indigenous peoples the right to determine their 
development, including active involvement in the development and determination of 
health, housing and other economic and social programs affecting them. If society is 
thought to be one, then these rights should apply to all people, as is stated in article 1 of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and article 1 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Moreover, if people on the ground 
have the right to decide on an economic order, humanity could motion to back out of 
neoliberal capitalism. 
 Although there is no direct reference to ‘neoliberalism’ or ‘Empire’, the United 
Nations Sustainable Development Goals target many of the destructive effects of late 
capitalism such as inequality, poverty, poor health and social injustice. Making these 
targets does not modify the neoliberal paradigm; they only serve– in a soft legal manner – 
as a challenge to its effects. The Sustainable Development Goals have their merit. They 
avoid the essentialism problem of naming the problem of postmodernity, but the Goals 
only answers the question of economic and social rights as well as the problems of 
governance and democracy. 
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 In this thesis, I have persistently followed the trail to cultural justice – paying 
special attention to spirituality. I believe we must be spiritually free in addition to being 
economically and socially free because the three are interconnected. As the Maastricht 
Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states, “all human 
rights are indivisible, interdependent, interrelated and of equal importance for human 
dignity.”212 That is the core of classical human rights theory. 
 If postmodernity is haunted by disenchantment in such a way that spirituality is 
nullified under neoliberalism, then who is to say that a treaty protecting culture in the 
manner I have spelled out in this conclusion cannot rejuvenate and kick-start society out 
of its disenchantment? Society could be given a lifeline to shake its Weltanschauung, 
which has allowed for such cruel treatment of people of any caste or class. A new 
Zeitgeist of optimism could result from such a change. Human rights may achieve this by 
working from above and below. That is, by treaty and then by pure imminence from 
person to person. 
 I must humbly state here my pessimism that such a treaty will take any committed 
effect anytime soon. States must firstly realize and embrace their populations’ role of 
equal global citizen and be willing to become duty-bearers in such a way that their people 
control their own culture. Yet, as Bilgrami noted, states tend to favor neoliberalism no 
matter how dead it is ideologically. For example, one would be hard-pressed to find 
Trump’s America commit to de-monopolizing, environmentalism, respecting indigenous 
treaties, or global peace. Unfortunately, Kant’s dream of perpetual global peace is a 
tricky one to realize when the world’s leading nations are engaged and heavily invested 
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in some form of conflict (i.e., the war on terror, the war on drugs, the war on 
immigration). In a world of perpetual warfare, peace itself seems to have changed 
meanings. To put it in figurative terms: if two parties blow in opposite directions on a 
teetering cradle and it does not fall, that is not peace. States in peacetime can still be in 
utter turmoil attempting to weather tensions (e.g., Kashmir, the Korean peninsula). 
 Today, the world is in a precarious condition. With irreversible climate change 
looming, we must realize our ethical role as global citizens. We must create long-term 
goals for our people and planet. This is all tied back into the politics of neoliberalism. 
Behind neoliberalism’s proliferation is its defective logic. The authors of Beyond the 
Spirit of Empire call it the 
Sacrificial logic of Empire: the demand to bathe itself 
continually in blood in the name of perpetual peace. The 
demands for blood in the name of peace and justice are 
understandable only by appealing to a notion of 
transcendence, whether to a god that demands sacrifices in 
exchange for salvation or to the sovereignty of the nation-
state/Leviathan.213 
 
Neoliberalism disseminates a utopian vision with an unrealizable horizon, and that is 
dangerous – not just those who espouse or think it, but to anyone living under its reign. 
 Despite my pessimism, I see reason in applying cultural rights against 
neoliberalism. Bergson sounds radically utopian – and he is – but recall how utopian the 
Chicago School was in their creation of a neoliberal dystopia. Subversive efforts can alter 
the course of human destiny. Neoliberalism has created pockets of wealth explosions 
around the world (e.g., China, Japan, Singapore and South Korea) but at a stiff cost to the 
human spirit. Whether it is denying human rights in the name of efficiency, or turning 
Earth into a legal person to restore meaning to lives, legal subversion is a considerable 
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tool for change. 
 For transformation in the direction of rights, dialogue is essential. Paulo Freire 
believed several elements are necessary for dialogue to be possible: love for the world 
and its people, humility, and “an intense faith in humankind, faith in the power to make 
and remake, to create and re-create, faith in their vocation to be more fully human.”214 
Neoliberalism undermines the very foundation of dialogue – which it also dominates. 
 On the other hand, there are plenty of states that have seen neoliberalism and want 
to go another way. Climate change mars most of the world now. Many smaller, weaker 
states are willing to go a different route now that climate change is already affecting 
them. 174 states are currently committed to the Paris Agreement. Nations like Denmark, 
Germany, and the Netherlands are producing innovative clean energy solutions. I assume 
many will soon follow. Such thinking is much more constructive and rational than the 
neoliberal counterpart. 
 In Warren Montag’s synthesis of Louis Althusser and Foucault, he writes: 
The dilemma we face is not how to secure greater rights 
and guarantees of our independence and autonomy, how to 
prevent the dominant ideology from infiltrating the 
sanctuary of our interiority, or how to transcend that which 
dominates us in order to negate through thought the 
existing state of affairs and imagine its utopian contrary. 
Our dilemma is rather how to increase our power, how to 
diminish the forces that individuate and separate us and 
thus prevent us from uniting with others in order to act and 
to think more effectively and with greater strength for our 
liberation.215 
 
Today, perhaps more so than when Arendt wrote about the Second World War, the world 
is in need of greater global unity. Postmodernity has shown that neoliberalism has a 
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totalizing effect on nearly everything. That is not the kind of unity I am calling for. 
Having a single community is less of a romantic idea than it is becoming a practical 
reality of postmodernity. The question is: How do we create an environment where open 
societies reign? I see the prudence in treating all humans as legal equals, which is 
consistent with human rights doctrine. That is one place to start. 
 Montag’s vision interpreted through the works of Althusser and Foucault can 
inform human rights policy. In a more open society, hyper-individualized citizenry’s 
separation can be overcome with unity. That starts with making more fully articulated 
cultural rights available to all human beings. Cultural rights are not the only rights that 
matter, but by all means, expansion of cultural rights to include all humans is a liberatory 
argument worth considering.  
SIEBER: TOWARDS SPIRITUAL DIGNITY 
 65 
Bibliography 
Anaya, S. James. Indigenous Peoples in International Law. New York: Oxford 
 University Press, 2004. 
Ardent, Hannah. The Human Condition, Second Edition. Chicago: University of Chicago 
 Press, 1958. 
Bandura, Albert. Self-Efficacy: The Exercise of Control. New York: Macmillan, 1997. 
––––––. “Toward a psychology of human agency.” Perspectives on Psychological 
 Science 1, no. 2 (2006): 164-180. 
Bennett, Jane. Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. Durham: Duke University 
 Press, 2010. 
Bilgrami, Akeel. “An Interview with Dr. Akeel Bilgrami.” Interview by Alexander 
 Sieber. January 30, 2018. Audio, 21:00. 
Bourdieu, Pierre. “The Essence of Neoliberalism.” Le Monde diplomatique [English 
 edition]. (1998). 
Brown, Wendy. “Wounded Attachments.” Political Theory 21, no. 3 (1993): 390-410. 
––––––. States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity. Princeton: Princeton 
 University Press, 1995. 
––––––. Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism's Stealth Revolution. Brooklyn: Zone Books, 
 2015. 
Bergson, Henri. Me´langes. Paris: PUF, 1972. 
––––––. The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. Translated by R. Ashley Audra and 
 Cloudesley Brereton. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1977. 
Buschendorf, Christa and Cornel West. Black Prophetic Fire. New York: Beacon Press, 
 2015. 
Butt, Ronald. “Mrs. Thatcher: The First Two Years.” Sunday Times 3 (1981): 1. 
Capra, Fritjof. “The Systems View of Life.” Environmentalism: Critical Concepts, Vol. 
 2, edited by David Pepper, Frank Webster, and George Revill. New York: Taylor 
 & Francis, 2003. 
Cazdyn, Eric. The Already Dead: The New Time of Politics, Culture, and Illness. 
 Durham: Duke University Press, 2012. 
Clayton, Philip. In Quest of Freedom: The Emergence of Spirit in the Natural World. 
 Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009. 
Curle, Clinton Timothy. Humanité: John Humphrey's Alternative Account of Human 
 Rights. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007. 
Cvetkovich, Ann. Depression: A Public Feeling. Durham: Duke University Press, 2012. 
Davies, William. The Limits of Neoliberalism: Authority, Sovereignty and the Logic of 
 Competition. London: Sage, 2014. 
Dean, Mitchell. Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, Second Edition. 
 Washington: Sage, 2010. 
Deleuze, Gilles. Foucault. Translated by Seán Hand. Minneapolis: University of 
 Minnesota Press, 1988. 
––––––. “Immanence: a Life” In Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975–
 1995, edited by David Lapoujade. New York: Semiotext(e), 2006. 
Dorrien, Gary. “An Interview with Dr. Gary Dorrien.” Interview by Alexander Sieber. 
 February 7, 2018. Audio, 39:00. 
SIEBER: TOWARDS SPIRITUAL DIGNITY 
 66 
Douzinas, Costas. Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of 
 Cosmopolitanism. London: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007. 
Dreyfus, Hubert L. and Charles Spinosa. “Further Reflections on Heidegger, 
 Technology, and the Everyday.” Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 23, 
 no. 5 (2003): 339-349. 
Dreyfus, Hubert L. and Paul Rabinow. Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
 Hermeneutics, 2nd Edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014. 
Dwker, Colin. “A New Zealand River Now Has The Legal Rights Of A Human,” NPR 
 March 16, 2017. 
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/03/16/520414763/a-new-zealand-
river-now-has-the-legal-rights-of-a-human 
Dworkin, Ronald. Religion without God. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013. 
Emmons, Robert A. “Sacred Emotions,” In Soul, Psyche, Brain: New Directions in the 
 Study of Religion and Brain-Mind Science, edited by Kelly Bulkeley, 93-110. 
 New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 
Eze, Emmanuel Chukwudi. “The Color of Reason: The Idea of “Race” in Kant’s 
 Anthropology” In Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. 
 Cambridge: Blackwell, 1997. 
Farley, Edward. Good and Evil: Interpreting a Human Condition. Minneapolis: Fortress 
 Press, 1991. 
Freeman, Walter J. “Brain Science on Ethics: The Neurobiology of Making Choices.” In 
 Soul, Psyche, Brain: New Directions in the Study of Religion and Brain-Mind 
 Science, edited by Kelly Bulkeley, 262-4. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 
Freire, Paulo. Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 30th anniversary edition. New York: 
 Continuum, 2000. 
Foucault, Michel. The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Volume I: An Introduction. 
 New York: Vintage, 1978. 
––––––. “The Social Triumph of the Sexual Will.” In Essential Works of Foucault, Ethics 
 Vol. 1: Subjectivity and Truth. New York: New Press, 1998. 
––––––. “Iran: The Spirit of a World without Spirit.” In Foucault and the Iranian 
 Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islam. Chicago: Chicago University 
 Press: 2005. 
––––––. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978- 1979. New 
 York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 
––––––. Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage Books, 2012. 
Ghamari-Tabrizi, Behrooz. “When Life Will No Longer Barter Itself: In Defense of 
 Foucault on the Iranian Revolution.” In A Foucault for the 21st Century: 
 Governmentality, Biopolitics and Discipline in the New Millennium. Newcastle 
 upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010. 
Golder, Ben. Foucault and the Politics of Rights. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
 2015. 
Goodman, Lenn E., and D. Gregory Caramenico. Coming to Mind: The Soul and Its 
 Body. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014. 
Hall, Stuart. “The Neoliberal Revolution: Thatcher, Blair, Cameron—The Long March of 
 Neoliberalism Continues.” Soundings 48 (2011): 9–27. 
Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. Empire. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000. 
SIEBER: TOWARDS SPIRITUAL DIGNITY 
 67 
––––––. Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire. New York: Penguin 
 Books, 2004. 
Hayek, Friedrich A. The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents: The Definitive Edition, 
 edited by Bruce J. Caldwell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007. 
Hopu and Bessert v. France. (Communication No 549/1993) 
 CCPR/C/60/D/549/1993/Rev.1, 29 December 1997. 
Humphrey, John P. “Political and Related Rights,” In Human Rights in International 
 Law: Legal and Policy Issues, edited by Theodor Meron, Oxford: Clarendon 
 Press, 1984. 
Hunt, Lynn. Inventing Human Rights: A History. New York: Norton, 2008. 
Ienca, Marcello and Roberto Andorno. “Towards new human rights in the age of 
 neuroscience and neurotechnology.” Life Sciences, Society and Policy 13, no. 1 
 (2017): 5. 
Illouz, Eva. Cold Intimacies: The Making of Emotional Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity, 
 2007. 
Indian Law Resource Center. Download Declarations_Booklet_2012_LRSpreads.pdf  
International Commission of Jurists. Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of 
 Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 26 January 1997, available at: 
 http://www.refworld.org/docid/48abd5730.html [accessed 22 February 2018] 
Kompridis, Nikolas. “On World Disclosure: Heidegger, Habermas and Dewey.” Thesis 
 Eleven 37, no. 1 (1994): 29-45. 
Kottman, Paul A. Love as Human Freedom. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017. 
Lash, Nicholas. The Beginning and the End of 'Religion'. Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press, 1996. 
Lefebvre, Alexandre. “Human Rights in Deleuze and Bergson's Later 
 Philosophy.” Theory & Event 14, no. 3 (2011). 
––––––. “Bergson, Human Rights, and Joy.” Continental Philosophy Review 50, no. 2 
 (2017): 201-223. 
Loy, David R. “The Religion of the Market.” Journal of the American Academy of 
 Religion 65, no. 2 (1997): 275-290. 
Martin, Jack, Jeff H. Sugarman, and Sarah Hickinbottom. Persons: Understanding 
 Psychological Selfhood and Agency. New York: Springer-Verlag, 2009. 
Martin, Will. “Nobel Prize-winning economist Stiglitz tells us why ‘neoliberalism is 
 dead’.” Business Insider UK 19.08 (2016). 
Mignolo, Walter D. “Huntington’s Fears: ‘Latinidad’ in the horizon of the 
 Modern/Colonial World.” In Hegemony and Multiculturalism. 10th International 
 Conference of Académie de la Latinité. Reference Texts. (2004): 386-409. 
Miller-McLemore, Bonnie J. “The Living Human Web: Pastoral Theology at the Turn of 
 the Century.” In Through the Eyes of Women: Insights for Pastoral Care, edited 
 by J. Stevenson-Moessner. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996: 9-26. 
Míguez, Néstor Oscar, Joerg Rieger, and Jung Mo Sung. Beyond the Spirit of Empire: 
 Theology and Politics in a New Key. London: SCM Press, 2009. 
Mirowski, Philip. Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived 
 the Financial Meltdown. London: Verso Books, 2013. 
Montag, Warren. ““The Soul is the Prison of the Body”: Althusser and Foucault, 1970-
 1975.” Yale French Studies 88 (1995): 53-77. 
SIEBER: TOWARDS SPIRITUAL DIGNITY 
 68 




Nicholson, Simon and Sikina Jinnah. New Earth Politics: Essays from the Anthropocene. 
 Cambridge: MIT Press, 2016. 
Nussbaum, Martha C. Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach. 
 Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011. 
Perry, Michael J. Religion in Politics: Constitutional and Moral Perspectives. 
 New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. 
Potkay, Adam. The Story of Joy: From the Bible to Late Romanticism. Cambridge: 
 Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
Rabinow, Paul, and Nikolas Rose. “Biopower Today.” BioSocieties 1, no. 2 (2006): 195-
 217. 
Rieger, Joerg and Kwok Pui-lan. Occupy Religion: Theology of the Multitude. Lanham: 
 Rowman & Littlefield, 2012. 
Rogers-Vaughn, Bruce. Caring for Souls in a Neoliberal Age. New York: Palgrave 
 Macmillan, 2016. 
Rorty, Richard. “Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality.” In Truth and Progress: 
 Philosophical Papers, vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998: 
 167–185. 
Ryan, Richard M. and Edward L. Deci, “Self-Regulation and the Problem of Human 
 Autonomy: Does Psychology Need Choice, Self-Determination, and Will?” 
 Journal of Personality 74 (Dec. 2004): 1557-85. 
Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949. 
Sandra Lovelace v. Canada, Communication No. 24/1977: Canada 30/07/81, UN Doc. 
 CCPR/C/13/D/24/1977. 
Scott, James C. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New 
 Haven: Yale University Press, 1985. 
Sen, Amartya. "Human Rights and Capabilities.” Journal of Human Development. 6, no. 
 2 (2005): 151-166. 
Silva, Jennifer M. Coming Up Short: Working-Class Adulthood in an Age of Uncertainty. 
 New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. 
Simpson, Audra. “On Ethnographic Refusal: Indigeneity, ‘Voice’ and Colonial 
 Citizenship.” Junctures: The Journal for Thematic Dialogue 9 (2007). 
Smith, James K. A. How (not) to be Secular: Reading Charles Taylor. Grand Rapids: 
 Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2014. 
Steger, Manfred B., and Ravi K. Roy. Neoliberalism: A Very Short Introduction. Vol. 
 222. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
Tallis, Raymond. “Rethinking Thinking.” Wall Street Journal, November 12, 2011. 
UNESCO. “Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity” (2001) 
UN General Assembly. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
 16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, p. 3, available at: 
 http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c0.html [accessed 23 March 2018] 
SIEBER: TOWARDS SPIRITUAL DIGNITY 
 69 
––––––. “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” 217 (III) A (Paris, 1948), 
 http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ (accessed October 4, 
 2017). 
––––––. “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (2007). 
United Nations. Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS  XVI, available 
 at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3930.html [accessed 23 January 2018] 
––––––. https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-
 3&chapter=4&clang=_en 
Vivieros de Castro, Eduardo. “Perspectival Anthropology and the Method of Controlled 
 Equivocation.” Tipiti: Journal of the Society for the Anthropology of Lowland 
 South America. 2, no. 1 (2004): 3–22. 
Waldron, Jeremy. Dignity, Rank, and Rights. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
Webster, David. Dispirited: How Contemporary Spirituality Makes Us Stupid, Selfish 
 and Unhappy. Washington, D.C.: John Hunt Publishing, 2012. 
Youatt, Rafi. “Personhood and the Rights of Nature: The New Subjects of Contemporary 
 Earth Politics.” International Political Sociology. 11, no. 1 (2017): 39-54. 
